Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Marlene Stone v. Richard Flint, Judy Flint : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David B. Stevenson; Brad C. Smith; Stevenson & Smith; Attorney for Appellant.
Robert L. Neeley; Neeley & Neeley; Attorney for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Marlene Stone v. Richard Flint, Judy Flint, No. 20090564 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1775

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 399-9910
Facsimile: (801) 399-9954
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARLENE STONE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 080907234

vs.

Trial Court No. 20090564

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

On Appeal from the Second District Court in and for the County of Weber, State of Utah,
Honorable Michael D. Lyon.

Robert Neeley
Neeley & Neeley
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Stevenson & Smith, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

RLED
STEVENSON & S M I T H , P. C?TAH APPELLATE COURTS
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
3986
BRAD c SMTH
DAVID B STEVENSON*
•ADMITTED IN UTAH AND TENNESSEE

TELEPHONE

WASHINGTON

..

JUN 04

2010

BOULEVARD

O G D E N , UTAH 8 4 4 0 3
( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 1 0 OR ( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 4 - 4 5 7 3
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 9 9 - 9 9 5 4

AMY F. HUGIE, OF COUNSEL
DAVID S. KUNZ, OF COUNSEL

Lisa Collins, Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State
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RE:

MARLENE STONE, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,
Defendants/Appellants, Case No. 080907234, Trial Court No.: 20090564- C ^

Dear Ms. Collins,
Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Appellant provides that "after
oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter" when pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of the
party. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(j) (2010). This matter was heard on
May 27, 2010 and no decision has been issued.
During oral argument the Honorable Judge Gregory K. Orme inquired whether
Appellants'third argument (concerning whether the trial court misstated or omitted
salient facts in its judgment) was waived for failure to object to the trial court's findings
of fact prior to appeal. The parties did not address the issue in their briefs. After the
hearing Appellant reviewed Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
applicable case law on the question and provides this supplemental authority to the
question raised.
Rule 52 provides that "the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to such findings . . ." Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Utah, Rule 52 (2010). In 2009 the Utah Supreme Court addressed the
difference between a challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings (i.e. the level of
detail) versus a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence when it stated:
A challenge to the adequacy of the court's findings is notably
different from a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. "It is
one thing for a party to say that the judge's findings are
erroneous because they are contrary to or unsupported by the
evidence, and quite another to say that the findings are

l

that a party/ challenge the evidentiary support for a court's
findings shortly after the court articulates them. But it is quite
a different matter and wholly necessary for a party to
challenge and thus afford the trial court "an opportunity to
correct the alleged error" of inadequately detailed findings in
order to provide for meaningful appellate review of the court's
decision. ..
State ex rel. K.F., 201 P.3d 985, lj 61 (Utah 2009)(quoting from 438 Main Street v. Easy
Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 54, 99 P.3d 801).
In the current case Appellants' third issue concerns whether the trial court's
Findings of Fact supported its conclusion and omitted or misstated salient facts which
were critical 10 its ruling. The Appellants" challenge was not to the adequacy or detail of
the trial court's findings, but the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court found that only
three lounging/loafing sheds, and some mobile gates and panels were on Stone's property
and in dispute in the suit. However, the testimony at trial showed a different picture. In
addition to the three sheds, mobile gates and mobile panels in dispute, at the time of the
closing on the real estate two feeders, a number of waterers, and the horse walker were
physically located on Stone's property. The Flints subsequently took possession of the
two acres, as well as the all the feeders, waterers and horse walker, all located on Stone's
property. Stone raised no objection to this, but objected only to the Flints taking the
gates, panels, and three lounging/loafing sheds on Stone's property. The trial court made
detailed findings and chose to omit the presence of feeders and waters on Stone's
property at the time of closing, that the Flints took possession of this personalty, and that
Stone did not to dispute Flint's ownership of the same. In addition, the trial court also
misstated the timing of when the horse walker was first discussed between the parties,
which was months after Flints purchased the property, and instead found that the parties
had discussed the horse walker at the time of closing-which timing is critical in
determining whether the REPC and Bill of Sale are ambiguous.
Appellants urge the panel to consider the above named authority when detemiining
whether Appellants third issue concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, and find that the
Appellants have not challenged the adequacy or level of detail of the trial court's
findings.
^—\
/Respect&Hy^

David B. SteveHson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARLENE STONE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 080907234

vs.

Trial Court No.: 20090564

RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,
Defendants/Appellants.
Jurisdictional Statement
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (2008).
Statement Of The Issues
1.

Did the trial court err in determining that the Real Estate Purchase Contract
between Appellants and Appellee was facially unambiguous and thereby excluding
parol evidence from the case notwithstanding the fact that the Contract and Bill of
Sale expressly included personal property outside the surveyed boundary of the
real property?
Determinative law for issue No.l: Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90; Cafe Rio
v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235; Dairies v. Vincent, 2008
UT51, 190 P.3d 1269.
Standard of Review for Issue No. 1: A reviewing court "review[s] a district court's
interpretation of a written contract for correctness, granting no deference to the
court below." Cafe Rio *{ 21.
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Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at Transcript
Volume 1, pp. 195-197; 205-229.
Did the trial court err in excluding witnesses under Utah R. of Evid. 401 when
their testimony was that Appellee attempted to sell them the same personal
property and real property that Appellee sold to the Appellants?
Determinative law for issue No.2: Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269.
Standard of Review for Issue No. 2: A trial court's decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Daines ^ 21. A trail court's ruling
on evidence will be reversed it if was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id.
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record in Transcript
Volume I, pp. 131-141.
Did the trial court err in its finding that certain farm equipment was not located on
Appellee's property at the time of the sale?
Determinative law for issue No.3: Western Capital and Securities, Inc. v.
Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah App. 1989); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156
(Utah App. 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989).
Standard of Review for Issue No. 3: A trial court's findings of fact will be reversed
if clearly erroneous. Gilmour v. Cummings, 904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995).
Issue preserved in the record: The issue was preserved in the record at R. Trans.
Vol. 1, pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149.
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Statement Of The Case
Nature of the Case:
The case heard by the trial court is a breach of contract and/or conversion claim
between the vendor and vendee of real property and farm-related personalty located in
Hooper, Utah. At issue is whether the Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaimants
(hereinafter "Flints") purchased all personal property of the
Appellee/Plaintiff/Counterdefendant (hereinafter "Stone") that constituted farm
equipment on her entire seventeen acre parcel, or merely the personal properly located on
the two-acre parcel. Ultimately, the trial court found that it had to construe the language
of the parties' Real Estate Purchase Contract, with its associated Addenda, and a Bill of
Sale.
Course of Proceedings:
This case was filed on 13 November 2008 in the Second Judicial District for
Weber County. Plaintiff Stone initially filed an eviction action against the Defendant
Flints alleging that Defendants committed waste on fifteen acres that Defendant Flints
leased from Plaintiff Stone. Defendants filed an answer and counterclaim on 20
November 2008 alleging causes of action for trespass, breach of contract, and conversion,
and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. On 2 February 2009 the parties reached a
Settlement Agreement in which Stone agreed to drop her claims against the Flints, and
the Flints agreed to drop all claims except for their claim for breach of contract and
conversion against Stone. In addition, the parties agreed to the terms and conditions of a
Joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction (R. at Exh. 7, ^J8 of Confidential
3

General Release and Settlement Agreement; Add. C). On 3 March 2009 the parties filed a
joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction enjoining Plaintiff Stone from
trespassing on Flints' property, enjoining Stone from direct contact with the Flints or
from parking or driving on their property, and enjoining Stone from any stalking
behavior. On 15 April 2009 at trial the parties stipulated to dismiss all actions except the
issues of the ownership of numerous fence panels and gates, and three lounging/loafing
sheds on Stone's real property.
Disposition by Trial Court:
All of the claims were resolved in the above-entitled action as a result of the final
judgment of the trial court dismissing the Flints' Counterclaim on 1 June 2009. This
appeal is taken from the court's Memorandum of Decision dated 24 April 2009, and it's
Orders Dismissing the Flints' Couterclaim and making Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, both dated 1 June 2009. (R. at 0069-79; 0087-88; 0089-96.)

Statement of Facts
1.

Stone owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah,
consisting of approximately seventeen acres. (R. at 0089.)

2.

Stone listed the property for sale on the multiple listing services, giving
prospective buyers three options: 1) purchase all seventeen acres, 2) purchase
two acres, or 3) purchase one acre. (R. at 0089-90.)

3.

The Flints were interested in the property. They and their realtor Joe Adair met
with Plaintiff on 1 February 2008. (R. at 0090.)
4

4.

During this initial meeting, Stone explained that her husband had recently
passed away, that she wanted to be relieved of the burden of managing the
property by herself, and that she was interested in selling, preferably, all of her
seventeen acres, including the structures on the property, but was willing to sell
it in smaller parcels. Because the Flints could not afford all seventeen acres, the
Flints indicated their interest in two acres. Mr. Flint inquired, "Does all of this
stuff stay with the property?" Stone replied affirmatively. When Flint asked
his question, he was looking out of Stone's bedroom window, facing to the east
of Stone's property, overlooking the hay bam, horse, bam, and various items of
personal property. The structures included mobile fencing, called panels;
mobile gates; movable open sheds for animals, called loafing sheds; waterers
and feeders for livestock, and a horse walker. (R. at 0090; Vol. 1, pp. 145-149;
185-186.)

5.

The Flints expressed to Stone that they wished to purchase two acres, including
the home and the two bams. (R. at 0090.)

6.

Stone explained that if the Flints bought only the two acres, she would retain a
sixty-six-foot-wide strip lying on the northern part of the property and
extending eastward, because she needed access to her remaining fifteen (15)
acres in the back. Without this access, Stone would have been unable to access
her property. (R. at 0090.)

7.

Stone also explained that a survey of the two acres would be necessary in order
to create separate legal descriptions for the two acres and the remaining fifteen
5

acres. At that time, the boundaries of the proposed two acres were
undetermined. (R. at 0090-91.)
8.

After the parties discussed the Flints' interest in only two acres and Stone said
that the two-acre lot being sold them included "all the loafing sheds, all the
gates, all the panels, all the waters, all the feeders, the horse barn and the hay
shed", no further discussion took place regarding any structures, including the
horse walker until after the sale. (R. at 0091; Vol. 1, pp. 145-149; 185-186.)

9.

Based on earlier discussions, the Flints believed that they were buying all the
personal property on the entire seventeen acres as part of the purchase. (R. at
0091.)

10.

On 1 February 2008, the Flints' real estate agent, Joe Adair, prepared and
presented a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") to Stone. The first
addendum to the REPC provided that Stone would have the property surveyed
and the four corners staked to the satisfaction of the Flints. The addendum also
listed the structures included in the sale as "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels,
gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as presently exist." (R. at 0031; 0091;
Exhibit or Exh. 1; Addendum or Add. A.)

11.

As agreed, Stone had the property surveyed and the four corners staked just
prior to closing, which occurred on 16 April 2008. (R. at 0092.)

12.

At the time of closing, two feeders, waterers, the horse walker, four sixteenfoot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafing
sheds were physically located on Stone's remaining fifteen acre parcel. Two
6

feeders, three lounging/loafing sheds and a much smaller number of panels and
gates were physically located on the Flints' property, plus 12 square panels (R.
at Vol. 1, pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149.)
13.

The Flints subsequently took possession of the two acres, as well as feeders,
waterers, and the horse walker, all located on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1,
pp. 148-49, 66-68; Add. C.)

14.

The horse walker was a large structure with a cement slab and was located on
Appellee Stone's property after the Flints' two-acre lot was surveyed. Stone
and the Flints expressly agreed to such, stating that the horse walker "is located
on the STONE'S real property but which is the property of Flint pursuant to a
16 April 2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale of
the same date." (R. Add. 3; Exh. 7, ^[9 of Confidential General Release and
Settlement Agreement; R. at 0032; Vol. 1, p. 125)

15.

Contemporaneous with the closing, Stone leased the remaining fifteen acres to
the Flints. The lease has since been terminated by mutual agreement. (R. at
0093.)

16.

Flints assumed the original address 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah upon the
purchase (i.e at closing) of Stone's home and two acres. At an unknown date
following the sale of Stone's home and lot, Stone received a new address for
her remaining 15 acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., in Hooper, Utah. (R. at
0092-93.)

7

Contemporaneously with the closing of the real property, the title company
prepared a bill of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the
closing. The bill of sale transferred title to "that certain personal real property
now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah." (R. at 0032; see Exh. 2 and Add. 2.)
The bill of sale then enumerated the personal property specified in the first
addendum to the REPC "as presently exist." Exh. 2; Add. 2; (R. at 0031-32.)
The Flints proffered the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and his wife Vickie
Harris, who were potential buyers of the same two-acre parcel that Ms. Stone
sold the Flints. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 132-141.) The Harris couple found Stone's
two-acre lot on the multiple listing service and viewed the property with their
realtor. At trial, when Jeffrey Harris was asked by Flints' counsel what
personal property (i.e. farm equipment) Ms. Stone stated was included with the
purchase of the two-acre parcel, Stone's counsel objected on numerous
grounds. Id. The trial Court excluded the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and
his wife Vickie Harris for lack of relevancy. The court stated, "I just don't
think it's relevant." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) The court stated, speaking of Ms.
Stone, "If she said something that she's now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint
is contending that it occurred, and she told him, then it would be very relevant,
because it would be an admission against interest.... the fact that she makes a
different offer to a different person on a different day can't be controlling in
this case." Id.
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19.

After the sale a dispute arose concerning the lease. At that time Ms. Stone for
the first time told Mr. Flint that he had to remove the horse walker to his
property and informed him that she disputed the Flints' ownership of three of
the loafing sheds and the mobile panels and gates located on her property. She
did not raise a dispute over feeders, waterers and the horse walker that were on
her property. Further, this was the first discussion between the parties
concerning the horse walker. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 66-69, 186-187; see also Vol. 1,
pp. 38-39, 60-63, 66-71, 88, 90, 145-149.)

Summary of Argument
The trial court conducted a full trial on Flints' (Defendants'/Appellants')
counterclaims for breach of contract and conversion concerning whether the three loafing
sheds and numerous mobile panels and gates were their property pursuant to the parties'
agreement. The court reviewed the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) between the
parties and determined that, according to the four corners rule, the document was
unambiguous. The Flints appealed. Three issues arise from the trial court's decision
below. The first issue concerns whether the Real Estate Purchase Contract is
unambiguous; the second issue concerns whether the court wrongfully excluded
witnesses; the third issue concerns misstatements of fact in the trial court's Findings of
Fact.
The trial court erred in finding that the REPC was unambiguous because the REPC
is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. At issue is whether the term "all",
9

used in the REPC and Bill of Sale in conjunction with a list of farm-related personalty,
referred to 'all' Stone's farm-related personal property on her adjoining acreage, the
personalty located on the two-acre lot sold to the Flints, or some combination of the two.
The court found the language unambiguous even though the REPC and Bill of Sale
specifically called out items which were not on the two-acre lot sold to the Flints and
were not separately discussed or negotiated for by the parties. Notably, the Bill of Sale
language selling "that certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT"
expressly included a horse walker that was not physically located at the new address. In
addition, waters and feeders that were on Stone's property at the time of closing were
possessed by the Flints. This extrinsic evidence also informs the court of the ambiguity
existing in the REPC and Bill of Sale, and opening the door to use parol evidence to
determine the parties' intent in the sale.
The trial court also erred when it excluded the testimony of two witnesses for the
Flints that were going to testify that they met with Ms. Stone and were interested in
buying the same two-acre property as the Flints. Their testimony of what personal
property (i.e., farm-related equipment) Ms. Stone stated was included in the sale was
excluded because the court found it irrelevant. The trial court reasoned that the
discussion was not the same transaction and therefore irrelevant.
Finally, the court's Findings of Fact omitted certain salient facts critical to the
court's decision. Specifically, the court omitted the fact that at the time the parties closed
on the real estate purchase, two feeders, several waterers, a horse walker, four sixteenfoot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafmg sheds were
10

physically located on Stone's adjoining parcel. The Flints gave testimony that they took
possession of the feeders, waterers and the horse walker following the sale. While the
court acknowledged in the Findings of Fact that the three lounging/loafing sheds, horse
walker and the mobile gates and panels were on Appellee Stone's property at the time of
sale, the court failed to acknowledge that feeders and waterers were located on Stone's
property as well, and that the Flints took possession of these items after the sale. Further,
the court misstated the evidence concerning whether the parties negotiated over the horse
walker and looked to (and misstated) parol evidence taken at trial to reach its decision,
notwithstanding its alleged reliance on the four-corners rule.

Argument
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REAL ESTATE
PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS UNAMBIGUOUS.
The trial court erred in its finding that the Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC")

and its accompanying addenda were not facially ambiguous, because the language
contained therein was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies." Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25 (quoting WebBankv. Am. Gen.
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, T| 20) (internal quotations omitted). Although the
language of the contract itself is to be the primary source in making a determination of
ambiguity, other evidence—if available—should be considered to determine whether
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ambiguity exits. Dairies at \ 26. After examining the four corners of the document and
any relevant evidence, if the court finds that the provisions in question are capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation, parol evidence should be admitted to determine
the parties' intentions. Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, If 9 (Utah 1995).
In this case, the trial court held that an Agreement consisting of a Real Estate
Purchase Contract and various addenda was facially unambiguous. However, the
provisions at issue in the trial court are capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation, and thus are ambiguous.
The trial court rested its determination that the contract was facially unambiguous
on two grounds. First, that Clause 1.1 of the REPC unambiguously asserted that the
property at issue was not included in the transaction, and second, that the bill of sale later
signed by the parties did the same.
1.

The REPC is Facially Ambiguous With Respect to Clause 1.1 and
Addendum No. One.

The REPC's Clause 1.1 and Addendum No. One create a facially ambiguous
contract provision when viewed together, because the provision is subject to more than
one reasonable interpretation. The trial court's determination that the contract at issue
was facially unambiguous rested in large part on its analysis of Clause 1.1 of the REPC,
which it found was "identical" to a contractual provision interpreted in a case recently
decided by this court, Flores v. Earnshaw. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 4.
Flores dealt with the sale of a not-yet-built condominium by use of a standard
form Real Estate Purchase Contract similar to the one used in this case. 2009 UT App 90,
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IHf 1-4. At issue was whether the parties had bargained for a fully built condominium
unit, or merely a "shell," i.e., a unit not containing all necessary fixtures and
infrastructure to make the building inhabitable and complete. Id. atfflj5-6. Plaintiffs
argument was essentially that because the condominium unit did not yet exist, Clause
1.1—which specified that certain items were included "if presently owned and attached to
the property"—was an ambiguous provision. Id. However, both parties were in
agreement that the word "presently" referred to the date of the REPC's execution, and
furthermore that "none of the items listed in Clause 1.1 were 'owned and attached to the
property' at the time the REPC was executed because the building was not yet
constructed." Flores ^J 14. On this basis, the Flores court found no ambiguity. Id.
The trial court's error here is the faulty analogy to Flores, The contractual
language at issue in the two cases is not the same. Flores interpreted only the standard
boilerplate of the REPC contract, and did not address the addition of additional terms by
an addendum. In other words, the ambiguity of the boilerplate provision of Clause 1.1 is
not the issue here; it is whether that provision even properly controls or modifies the
language in Addendum One. Also, the transaction in Flores did not involve the transfer
of personal property not located on the real properly, as in this case. Furthermore, all the
property at issue in this case actually existed at the time of sale, thus Clause 1.1 has
significantly different implications here.
The standard boilerplate language of Clause 1.1 of the REPC reads as follows:
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following
items if presently owned and attached to the Property: plumbing, heating, air
conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in
13

appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and
rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; window blinds;
awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently
affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s);
fencing; and trees and shrubs.
This was the portion of Clause 1.1 at issue in Flores, which was found to be
unambiguous in terms of what is included in the sale. However, this language is not
Clause 1.1 in its entirely. Clause 1.1 also contains the following sentence immediately
after the language quoted above: "The following items shall also be included in this sale
and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:" (emphasis added).
This "also" provision of Clause 1.1 is followed by blank lines, on which, in the instant
case—other items included in the sale are listed in handwriting. Here, the oven/range,
refrigerator, and "window coverings as presently exist" are the items listed on those blank
lines.
The items named in the boilerplate portion of Clause 1.1 all are linked by a
common thread; they are all items physically attached and are thus considered "part o f
that building, i.e., "fixtures." As such, these fixtures are included in the sale, if present.
However, it is the prerogative of the parties involved as to whether other, nonpermanent
items, such as large household appliances should be included in the transaction. These
items, while perhaps difficult to move, are not part of the building in the way that fixtures
are.
Therefore, the "also included" portion of Clause 1.1 is significant in that it
contemplates items not "presently owned and attached to the Property" in the way that
fixtures necessarily must be. In other words, such items "also included" are not subject to
14

being presently owned and attached to the property, but are included in the transaction by
virtue of a provision separate from the first part of Clause 1.1. Clearly then, personal
property located away from the real property can be included, such as the seller's
personal property located on adjoining real property, or in a storage facility offsite.
This "also included" clause is especially significant with respect to Addendum
One of the REPC, as it highlights the inconsistencies in the trial court's ruling.
Addendum One is incorporated into the agreement by Clause 9 of the REPC, and contains
the following language, in pertinent part:
This is an addendum to [the REPC], including all prior addenda and
counteroffers between Richard & Judy Flint as Buyer, and Marlene Stone as
Seller, regarding the Property located at 6006 So. 7100 West Hooper. The
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC: Included items: All
lounging/loafing sheds -panels, gates, feeders/caterers & horse walker as
presently exist (emphasis added).
Exh. 2; Add. 2; (R. at 0031-32.)(emphasis added).
The trial court determined that this portion of Addendum One is properly
integrated into Clause 1.1 of the REPC, and thus subject to the requirement that all the
items listed therein be "presently owned and attached to the Property." Id. However, this
determination is wrong. Because the items listed in Addendum One are all readily
moveable, not attached to the property, and thus not properly considered "fixtures," it
would be a reasonable interpretation of the contractual terms to determine that these items
are governed by the second portion of Clause 1.1, and thus part of the transaction
notwithstanding the language of the first portion. This interpretation is a reasonable one
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based on the plain language of Clause 1.1 of the REPC and Addendum One? and is
therefore a valid basis for a finding of facial ambiguity.
A third interpretation is also possible. The REPC explicitly specifies in Clause 9
that the terms of all addenda are incorporated into the REPC. However, the integration
clause does not specify any specific part of the REPC to which those addenda must be
integrated. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the terms contained in Addendum
One stand on their own as a separate provision of the agreement, and are not necessarily
modified or controlled by the language in any part of Clause 1.1 at all. In such a scenario,
there would also be no requirement that any of the property listed in Addendum One be
"presently attached" to the property at the time of sale.
Clearly, the language contained in the REPC and Addendum One is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation, even when viewed in light of Clause 1.1. The
ambiguity there lies mainly in how much, if any, of Clause 1.1 is actually applicable to
the analysis of Addendum One. No evidence other than the plain language of the
documents is required to support this analysis.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it disallowed parol evidence to determine
the intent of the parties regarding the items listed in Addendum One.
2.

The Bill of Sale is Facially Ambiguous.

The trial court also substantially based its decision on a determination that the bill
of sale executed by the parties at closing was facially unambiguous. The bill of sale,
among other things, contains a recitation of certain personal property intended to be
conveyed in the transaction, and reads, in pertinent part:
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SELLER . . . have/has bargained, sold, assigned and transferred, and by these
presents do/does bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said BUYER that certain
personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT, 84315 WEBER County,
State of UT, particularly described as follows: Oven/Range, Refrigerator,
Window Covering, 2 Water Irrigation Shares, All Lounging and Loafing Sheds,
Panels, Gates, Feeders, Waterers, and Horse Walker as presently exist.
The trial court relied on the language "now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT" to
support its finding that the bill of sale was unambiguous. However, although at the outset
this language appears to clearly limit the personal property transfer to include items then
located on the two acres that would, upon recordation with Weber County, become the
Flint's new address, this was not its function at all. Significantly, the included horse
walker was located entirely on Stone's property. Thus, if the unambiguous meaning of
the bill of sale is that the items included were only those then located on the two acres
comprising the new address, correct application of such an instrument necessarily
excludes the horse walker, a multi-ton structure permanently affixed to large,
subterranean concrete blocks that eventually required the use of heavy equipment to move
onto the Flint's property. Because of these permanent characteristics, the horse walker
was affixed to Stone's property. Although, as the trial court noted, the walker was
connected to the horse barn located on the new address via electrical wiring, that
connection was much less significant than the walker's physical presence on Stone's
properly, and could have been severed much more easily. And although the arms of the
horse walker would pass partially over the Flint's property at their ends were the walker
rotates, a structure that merely casts a shadow onto a neighbor's property does not
become part of, or somehow move onto that property.
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If the construction adopted by the trial court is taken to its logical extreme, the bill
of sale must be construed not to refer to this horse walker at all (which was, incidentally,
the only such apparatus in the vicinity), but to some hypothetical machine no longer
located at the specified address. However, the fact remains that this selfsame horse
walker—located just outside the Flint's new property line at the time the bill of sale was
executed—was in fact the one contemplated by the parties, as evinced by its subsequent
removal to the other side of the Flint/Stone property line. In Ward, the Utah Supreme
Court held regarding facial ambiguity that "[w]hen determining whether a contract is
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of
ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of
the judge's own linguistic education and experience.'" 907 P.2d at 268. Under the Ward
rule, the horse walker's location and subsequent removal was certainly proper evidence
for the trial court to consider in determining whether the bill of sale was ambiguous. The
language of the provision, the walker's location, and its eventual destination are ample
evidence of ambiguity within the bill of sale. Specifically, they show the existence of a
dichotomy that must be resolved: does "certain personal property now at 6006 S. 7100 W.
Hooper, UT" mean only the enumerated items actually located at that address, or does it
mean something else? (such as "certain other items in the vicinity of the address?")
The trial court attempted to resolve this issue by implying in its decision that the
horse walker was "otherwise specifically identified" in the bill of sale. Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law TJ5. While the trial court construed the bill of sale to limit the
transaction only to "personal properly presently existing on the two acres conveyed," it
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reasoned that this "specific identification" was the basis for carving out an exception to
that construction.
However, this distinction is illusory. Each category of the items at issue
here—the loafing sheds, panels, gates, waterers, feeders, and horse walker—is
"specifically identified" in the bill of sale. None of the items is identified in any different
manner than any of the others. The only real significant distinction between the horse
walker and the rest is that there existed multiple loafing sheds, panels, gates, waterers and
feeders—some on the property described by the address, some off—and only one horse
walker, located outside the two acres. The horse walker referred to in the bill of sale is
not identified as being off the Flint's property, but is simply another in the list of
enumerated items. Thus, the bill of sale itself, if construed according to the meaning
given it by the trial court, provides no basis for an inference that the transaction includes
anything located off the Flint's property, horse walker or otherwise. Yet, the actions of
the parties clearly demonstrate that this was the horse walker contemplated in the
transaction. It is undisputed that the transaction always included the horse walker, which
was not bargained for separately, or identified in any different manner than any other
category of item.
The unavoidable conclusion is that the bill of sale is a facially ambiguous
document. If construed according to the plain-language requirement advanced by the trial
court—that the transaction included only items presently existing on the two acres—the
reader of the bill of sale must ask "to what horse walker does this document refer?" One
could either infer then that no horse walker was to be included—as none was then present
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on the property—or that the only horse walker in the vicinity was in fact the one
described in the document. Either interpretation could reasonably be arrived at. On the
one hand, the document names a nonexistent, merely hypothetical horse walker (the one
that should be present on the property, but is not); on the other, it implies that its earlier
condition—that all items be present on the property—is not really a hard-and-fast rule.
Either way, a plain-text examination of the bill of sale, in light of the number of horse
walkers actually in existence on and around the property, leads to unclear results.
Because of this problem, the bill of sale is facially ambiguous, and the trial court erred by
disallowing parol evidence to determine the intent of the parties regarding the panels,
gates, and loafing sheds.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING WITNESSES ON
RELEVANCE GROUNDS.
The trial court wrongfully excluded two of the Flints' witnesses at trial. The Flints

intended to use the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and his wife Vickie Harris, who
were potential buyers of the same two-acre parcel and farm equipment that Ms. Stone
sold the Flints. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 132-141.) The Harris couple found Stone's two-acre lot
on the multiple listing service and viewed the property with their realtor. At trial, when
Jeffrey Harris was asked by Flints' counsel what personal property (i.e., farm equipment)
Ms. Stone stated was included with the purchase of the two-acre parcel, Stone's counsel
objected on numerous grounds. Id. The court found their testimony irrelevant. The court
failed to find it relevant to determining what personal property Stone was selling with the
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two-acre lot, her motive to get rid of the animal-related equipment, her state of mind, her
intentions, plan or scheme for selling ALL of the farm equipment, or to disprove what she
claimed in court, that she only intended to sell a portion of the personal property outside
of the surveyed two-acre plot.
Ultimately the Court accepted Stone's objection to the testimony. That objection
was as follows: "Your Honor, they are entirely two different dates, two different
situations, two different parties. I don't see the connection between the two. But if she
ever said anything to him, it would not be relevant to the case at hand where we have his
testimony and his written contract." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 140.) The court responded, "I'm
going to sustain that, the objection." The whole point of the Harris's testimony was to
show the consistency of the Flint's testimony and the inconsistency or fallacy of Stone's.
The Harrises did not receive a different offer than the Flints; they received the same offer.
Nevertheless the court stated, "even assuming the best scenario for your client. . . she
made an offer to him, and then days later made a different offer to your client, doesn't
necessarily mean that the offer she made to him is the same one she made him. People
change their mind. And I just don't think it's relevant." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.)
The court later stated, speaking of Ms. Stone, "If she said something that she's
now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint is contending that it occurred, and she told him,
then it would be very relevant, because it would be an admission against interest.... the
fact that she makes a different offer to a different person on a different day can't be
controlling in this case." Id.

21

A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269. A trial court's ruling on
evidence will be reversed if it was beyond the limits of reasonability. Id. This Court
should find that the trial court's ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability. "'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 401 (2009).
It is well understood that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible" and "[e]vidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 402 (2009). Futher, relevant,
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 403 (2009).
The trial court did not rely on Rule 403 for its ruling that the Harris' testimony was
irrelevant. Instead, the court simply found the testimony not relevant because the "the
fact that she makes a different offer to a different person on a different day can't be
controlling in this case." (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.) The trial court misses the mark. The
testimony was offered to show that Ms. Stone extended to the Harrises the same offer as
the Flints. Such testimony is relevant to know what Ms. Stone's offer was to the Flints,
which constitutes an independent act of significance which is not hearsay. Also, it is a
statement of a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2). It shows whether the Flints are
telling the truth about the sale of personal property and Stones lack of propriety in
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asserting she did not intend to sell ALL the farm equipment with the two acres. Under
Rule 401, relevance is a low bar. All that need be show is that the evidence has a
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R.
Civ. P. rule 401 (2009).
If Ms. Stone said to a third party that the same two-acre lot the Flints purchased
includes all farm equipment on Stone's property, this makes the existence of her intent to
include in the sale personal property not physically located on the two-acre plot more
probable, and her statements to the contrary less probable. If Stone intended with more
than one buyer to include in the sale items not physically located on her property, this is
relevant. An examination of what Stone said to these potential buyers is highly relevant.
At minimum, the statements go to the weight of the evidence and assist the trier of fact in
determining the credibility of the parties' testimonies. Stone's potential sale to the
Harris's was for the same two acres of real property and their testimony as to what
personal property was included is not "a different offer". (R. at Vol. 1, p. 141.)
Therefore, this Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion and hear the
testimony.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING AND MISSTATING
CERTAIN SALIENT FACTS FROM ITS FINDINGS OF FACT.
The trial court's Findings of Fact used facts that supported its conclusion and

omitted or misstated salient facts which were critical to its ruling. The Court found at Iffi
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12 and 13 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that only three lounging/loafing
sheds, and some mobile gates and panels were on Stone's property and in dispute in the
suit.
However, the testimony at trial showed a different picture. At the time of the
closing on the real estate, two feeders, a number of waterers, the horse walker, four
sixteen foot and eleven ten foot panels, twelve square panels, four mobile gates, and three
lounging/loafing sheds were physically located on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 6871, 88, 90.) Two feeders, three lounging/loafing sheds and a much smaller number of
panels and gates were physically located on Flints' property. Id.
The Flints subsequently took possession of the two acres, as well as the all the
feeders, waterers and horse walker, all located on Stone's property. Stone raised no
objection to this, but objected to the Flints taking the gates, panels, and three
lounging/loafing sheds on Stone's property. (R. at Vol. 1, pp. 145-149; 185-186.)
The trial court ignored the fact that there was testimony that the waterers and
feeders were on her property, that the Flint's took possession of them, and that Stone
never raised this in her suit. It focused on the horse walker and misstated the evidence
about whether the parties negotiated the horse walker before the sale—in order to explain
away why the horse walker's expressly being sold in the REPC did not make the contract
ambiguous. In fact, the opposite was true.
Ms. Stone, when pinned down on the issue, ultimately agreed that there was no
discussion about the horse walker before it was included in the REPC on February 1,
2008, and Mr. Flint testified that they never discussed the horse walker until after the sale
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when a dispute arose concerning the fifteen acres they lease from Stone. (R. at Vol. 1, pp
66-68, 145-149, 185-186.) The settlement reached by the parties in dismissing some the
claims before the trial shows that Stone required that the horse walker be moved in
February 2009 as part of the settlement negotiations. (R. at Exh. 7; Add. C) This is not
the same as the trial court's assertion that that negotiations between the parties to
purchase the horse walker occurred before the contract was made. The court
misunderstood or misstated the facts and instead inferred that the reason Stone sold the
horse walker on her real property was because Flints specifically requested it. They did
not.
The trial court also found that because the shadow of the horse walker's arms
passed over the Flint's property—and because the electrical connection for the
equipment attached to the Flint's barn—the multi-ton structure/fixture located on Stone's
property somehow became a part of the Flints' properly. Such reasoning is nonsensical.
It is important that in the settlement agreement, Stone expressly agreed that the horse
walker was on her property—she also stated such in her trial testimony. (R. at Exh. 7, ^9
of Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement; R. at 0032; Vol. 1, p. 125;
Add. 3.)
The Court of Appeals should find that the trial court erred by omitting from its
Findings the fact that feeders and waters were located on Stone's property at the time of
the sale, but Stone never disputed the Flints' right to these items. Also salient is the fact
that the parties never discussed the horse walker before it was included in the REPC and
Bill of Sale. Only after the sale was complete for the two-acre plot and the Flints had
25

leased the fifteen acres did a dispute arise; the horse walker was then part of a discussion
about which items of personalty Stone would choose to dispute.
These extrinsic facts are important for the court to determine whether the REPC
and Bill of Sale are ambiguous. Without knowledge of what was negotiated (or, in the
case of the horse walker, what was not negotiated), what was physically located on
Stone's property versus Flints' two-acre plot, and what became in dispute, the Court
cannot reasonably determine the ambiguity of the REPC and Bill of Sale. The court's
omission of these facts will be reversed if clearly erroneous. Gilmoiir v. Cummings, 904
P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, the Flints have marshaled the evidence to
show that the trial court's Findings at paragraphs 12 and 13 were clearly erroneous. For
these reasons the court should find that the trial court erred in excluding these facts from
its Findings.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Flints (Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaimants)
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals take the following actions:
•

Find that the REPC, its addenda and final Bill of Sale, are facially ambiguous:

•

Remand the case to the trial court to make findings regarding the
Defendant/Appellants' intent to buy and Plaintiff/Appellee's intent to sell the
disputed personal property physically located on Stone's real property following
the survey and sale of real property (i.e. all farm equipment, including three
lounging/loafing sheds, and numerous mobile panels and gates)
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•

Order the trial court to hear any necessary parol evidence to deduce the parties'
intent;

•

Order the trial court to determine whether a contract was formed with respect to
the disputed personal property and to make findings stating whether there was a
meeting of the minds concerning these disputed items of personal property;

•

Order the trial court to compensate the Flints for their losses if there was no
meeting of the minds concerning this disputed property and therefore no contract;

•

Order the trial court to allow the testimony of Jeffrey Dean Harris and Vickie
Harris, husband and wife, concerning their discussions with Stone relevant to
whether personal property on her real property is/was included in the sale of the
two acres of real property eventually sold to the Flints;

•

Find that the trial court failed to recognize that in addition to the three
lounging/loafing sheds and the horse walker, which were all on Stone's real
property, two feeders, a certain number of waterers, the horse walker, four sixteenfoot and eleven ten-foot panels, four mobile gates, and three lounging/loafing
sheds, as well as twelve square panels were located on Stone's property at the time
of the sale; that Stone only disputed the ownership of the three lounging/loafing
sheds and the mobile panels/gates;

•

Award Flints their attorney's fees for this appeal. The settlement agreement
between the parties expressly allows attorney's fees for resolving this issue
concerning the ownership interest in the loafing/lounging sheds and panels/gates.
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Addendum A, ^f 17 of 3 February 2009 Settlement Confidential General Release
and Settlement Agreement.
Respectfully Submitted,

Brad C. Smith, 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE."

Bill of Sale
(WITH WARRANTIES)

Know all Men by These Presents:

That Craig D. Stone and Marlene K. Stone as Trustees of The Stone Famiily Revocable Trust U/A
dated February 1, 2007 the SELLER, for and in consideration of the sum of: Ten Dollars and Other
Valuable Considerations to _me/us_ in hand paid by Richard Flint and Judy Flint, the BUYER, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have/has
presents do/does

bargained, sold, assigned and transferred, and by these

bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said BUYER that certain personal property now at

6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, UT. 84315

WEBER County, State of UT, particularly described as follows:

Oven/Range, Refrigerator, Window Covering, 2 Water Irrigation Shares, AH Lounging and Loafing
Sheds, Panels, Gates Feeders, Waterers, and Horse Walker as presently exist
And the Seller upon the consideration recited above warrants ownership of and good title to said property,
the right to sell the same and that there are no liens, encumbrances or charges thereon or against the same
and to defend the title and possession transferred to the BUYER against all lawful claims.
In Witness Whereof, I/We have hereunto set My/Our hand(s) this 16th day of April, 2008

mx^Zj^ri/i

(l /&<&-

Marlene K. Stone (Trustee)

ADDENDUM B
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

«AlTOR»
Tnte fe * l*s»*y ttnm*$ c o n t r o l U t i * »»w iwquirai r»*i H U t * D c t n u t i *o u#* Cti* tornt, fcuy#r «ml 8«fl«r, tio**v«r ( may a ? * * * to «Kar o r
d 4 « » lt» provftftai* or to U M a d l f l w w t *OOTL If you d » 4 r * togiif Qf t * * actvtct, conrutt your attorn*? or tex advisor.

/ I

j

:

E A R N E S T ^ N e Y RECEIPT

Buyer.
„ offers to purehae© foe Property
describeddtefDWand hensby deliver? to the Brotareae,
fijtta Eaniast Money the amount of &
t * UJtTt)
in the form
which, upon Acceptance of this otfer by all parties (as
ofdefined in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state law.
Received by:

^

--

on.

Brokerage;.

/Mhr^
(»**)

Phone Number,

1. PROPERTY:
also deactfbed
„ ^
City of
/TlSk&fA

^
&*£

—^

^
- , County o f - j £ ^ J k J 2 j * ^

,__,_. _,___,_, . ... .
^^^
. state dt tteh Zip g ^ ^ ? / ^

1.1 Included Item*. Unleaa excluded herein, this sale include* the following items ff presently owned and attached to
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling tans; water Heater, buIMn appliances; light
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtain*, diepohee and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows;
window blinds: awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dtehes end system, permanently affixed carpets: automatic
garage door opener end accompanying transmitter^); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be
inc*jrd«fCNr> this sate Mid conveyed finder separate Bill of $ate with warrant!** as to titip nyr*^t+jwe
r
1*2 Eitcludad Items. The following items are excluded from tnte sale: JL
_ ^

1.3JWjter Rights, Tti
The fan

_,-^/

ing water right* are included In this *»>«; „ ' for ,/m.fv ^ V

Z, PURCHASE PRICE, The Purchase Price for ttfe Property is $

C- &*lih? c

ZYV^f

. y / g / r,g2zi

2.f Method of PayjwmL The Purchase Price will b* paid as. fallows
$

$
$

(*) E&rneat Money Daponit Under certain condltl&ns described lit this Contract, THIS
DEPOSIT WAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDA&LE.
fbj New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a,new loan a* prov&tbd in Section 2,3, Buyer will apply
for one or more of the following loan*: r / f CONVENTIONAL [ ) FHA [ 1VA
I } OTHER (specify)
•
If on FHA/VA Joan applies see attached FHA/VA loan Addendum.

-

&

—

^

-•

r

tw,-

-,-. - » . a f ^ ^ l

kd»a
(S«e attacned Assumption Addendumm applicable)
(c) Loan Assumption Addendum
Seller Financing (aee.flttacrpc
jd Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
^Jg^l,.
(•) Other (*pecrty)
(0 Bilance of Purchaa* Pricm In Cafth at Settlement
PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lim»* (a) through (f)

2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a) b^Buyer** obligation to purchase th«f PTOperty IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable !oan(a)
• 'referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the 'Loan"), This condition is referred to ess the "Financing Condition,"
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a ban. Section
2v3 does not apply.

Page 1 of 6 pmges
B^B Rev ey03

Setter's I n i t i a l ^ S H ^ ^ -

Data

Q/JM

2.3 Application for Loan.
|a) Buyer's dutivt. No later than the Loan*Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24{a)T Buyer shall
apply for the Loan, l o a n Application" occur* onty when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed, and delivered to th*
lender (the "Lender*) the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (II) paid ell loan
application fees as required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Suyer will prompt^
provide the Lender with any addition^ documentation as required by the Lender,
(b) Procedure If Loan Application is dented. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender
doe* not apprwt the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Dor-war). Buyer shall, no later titan three calendar days thereafter,
provide a copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, uvHhln three calendar daye after Seller* receipt of such notice,
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section
2.3(b): (I) If the Notice of Loan Denial wa* received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in
Section 24(d), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer {ii) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received
by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, Bjytj Seller agree* to accept as
Seller^ exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damage*. A failure to cancel as provided in this
Section 2,3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a)- Cancellation pursuant to
the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions.
2.4 AppMlsaJ Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the PropertyftujflS [ ) IS NOT conditioned upon the Property
appra&infl for not less than the Purchase Phce, This condition is nglwred to ae the -Appral«e( Condition*. If the
Appraisal Condition apptle* and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property ha* appraised for
less than ihe Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Vatuew>, Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of
such written notice to Seller no later than three days after Buyers receipt of such written notice, in the event of 2
cancellation under thi$ Section 2,4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value waft received by buyer no later than the
Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(e). the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (0) If the Notice
of Appraised Value was received by Buyer after thai date, the Earnest Money Deport ahall be released to Seller and
Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Depoeit a* liquidated damages. A failure tc
cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 shall he deerrred a waiver of the Apprateal Condition by Buyer Cancellation
pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed oy such other provisions
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING,
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on o dote upon which Buyer and
Seller agrae in writing. "Setttemenr shall occur only when all of the following have been competed: (a) Buyer and Seller
have signed md delivered to each other or to the escrow/dosing offfce all documents required by this Contract, by the
Lender, by written escrow Instructions ar by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buy*r under these
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the esciow/downg office
in the torm of collected or cleared fund©; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the ©scrowfclosjng office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer
shall each pay one-half (?) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process.
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rente, and interest on assumed obligations ehail be prorated At Settlement as
set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited tox security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid
rents) $riall b* paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. Prorations, set forth in this Section shall be made as or the
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed bo in writing by the parties. Such
wilting could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement ha$ been
competed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by
the Ladder to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (\i) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (») and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed
within four calendar days of Se&ernent
4.

POSSESSION. SettF^allterivw^ys^^^

[ J

.hpui* [ i

^day* aftef-Cloelfig;
£SL£3

Y

6.
XK*13EfK?? r~~"
~ipm™——-5. CONFIRMATION
CONF1RI
DisCLOSOBETWIhc
f] Buyer a Initiate
[ ^ife S e e r ' s Initial*

signing of' "this Contract:

Pie Listing Agent,

., represents [^ffeeller [ frEuy«>r[ Iboih-faiytr and Seller

The Listing Broker,
The Selling Agent

-A

SLJ- L~
f?
n *
^S 7/rf-l£.—/Jb&AJtW&4Y...

_

^_^*3fe£tfL

The Silling
ino Broker,.

P*0# 2 of S pages
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y
a s * Limited Agent;
represents P i Seller [ JJEUiyef[ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
represents {-+****?[/)
Buyer [ HKUIL Buyei ind Seller
, r«pra*enta HMtoHer f / j Buyer [ JbethBuyapend Seller

Seller1* l n H i a t e M / / ^ Kfc.

D*te_£L3_'4 / _-05( Buyer's i f i l t l a l ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ —

Date2Jll^3
nFwTTA 1

6- T l t l E INSURANCE. At Settlement, Salter agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owners policy of title insurance
insuring Buyer in the aimount of the Purchase Price Any additional title Insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Saner Disclosure Deadline ref«ranO«d m Section 24(b), Seller shall
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to a* the "Seller Disclosures*:
(Ml a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and doted by Seller;
(b) 8 commitment for the policy of title insurance;
(c> a copy of any leases; affecting the Property not expiring prior lo Closing;
(d) written notice of any claims end/or conditions known io Seller relating to environments problems and building or
zoning code violations; and
(«) Other (specify)
_
:

ft, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this Contract (cheek appHcubtt bo*e«):
(a) y \ IS [ ] 18 HOT conditioned upon Buyer'* approval of the content of all the Setter Disclosures refecenced in Section ?;
(bj tyftS [ ) IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
(ci'TyflS [ ] IS MOT conditioned upon Buyers approve! ot s survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"};
(d) yrfIS
[ ] 18 MOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the coat, terms amd availability of homeowner's insurance
,
covenape for the Property;
(*) y i IS [ ] I S NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following teste and evaluations of the Property: (specify)

If any of the above Hems are checked In the affirmative, then Section* 6.1, B.2, 8 3 nnd 8.4 apply; otherwi$e, they do
not apply. The terns checked in the affirmative above are collectively rotarfed to as the "Evaluation* & Inspections," Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspection* shall be paid for by Bsuyer and shall b& conducted by
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees tc cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the
walk-through inspection under Section 11.
fi.1 Evaluation* & Inspections Deadline, No later than ih^ Evaluation* & Inspections Deadline referenced In
Section 24(c) Buyer ©hall: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & inspections
are acceptable to Buyer.
5.2 Right to Cancel or Object H Buyer rjeletmines that the Evaluations & Inspection* are unacceptable. Buyer may,
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, efcher, (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b} provide Seller with written notice of objections,
B.3 Failure to Fteapond. ir by th* expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel
this Contract &z provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the Evaluations & Inspection!; shall be deemed approved by Buyer,
M Response by Seller, If Buyer provide* written abjections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of
resolving Buyers objections Except as provided in Section 10.2. Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may
cancel true Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration ofUra Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be Pleased to Buyer. If this Contraa is not canceled by Buyer under
this Section 8.4, Buyers objections shallfcwdafrmed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall nol affact those items warranted
in Section 10.
9, ADDITIONAL TERMS. ThereJ/]ARE (s^VfHr-NOT^ddencia to this Contract containing additional terms. If there
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference! pJ^etfBendum N o . j & k ^ , , .
[-•f-flhtftaTTInTncinB Addendum M rHJVVA Ltran Addendum [-frAe«Mmfl*ton Aridondfim
f-j'tttlMSSttiHi Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (In some transaction* this di9do»ur* i* required by law)
J—tttfS^iaifBti PolntAtldenAiw («n some transactions tht* addendum itfWuirfrd tar la*?
pother (*p*cKy).X^^^
ErH^t_
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10. SeUJEfc WARRANTIES t REPRESENTATIONS.
1 <M Condition of Title, Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and win convey good and marketable
title to Buyer it Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the
following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, C C & R ' E (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and
rights-of-way; and subject to the content* of the Commitment for Titie Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section B,
Buyer also agrees to take the Properly subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing,
Buyer agree* to be response for tax«*, assessments, homeowners association cues, utilities, and other service*
provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Sailer
wW cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust Geedt, judgments, mechanic'* liens, tax Dene and warrant*. Seller
will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues.
10.2 Condition of Property* Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
{*) the Property shall b& broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant movingrelated Ctamage to the Property shall be repaired at Sailer's expem«;
(b) the heating, pooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances end fireplaces will
b* in workhg order and fit for thair intended purposes;
(cfr the roof &nA foundation ehall be fn&e of leaks known to Seller;
j<f| any private well or septic lank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order
and fit tor Its Intended purpose; and
(#J the Property and improvements, including tne landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on
the dale of Acceptance.
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. Ttie "Home Warranty Plan" referenced In this Section 10.3 Is separate from the warranties
provided by Seller under Section* 10.1 and 10.2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-yerar Home Warranty Plan
hdWlLL-C } WILL NOT be included in this transaction If Inducted, the Home Warranty Plan shall be ordered by LXftuyar
[ j Sellor andj^eHbe issued by a company selected by p f B u y e r H . S i H e ^ T h * cost of the Home Warranty Plan shall
not excaod S J j L 6 j - 2 _ and Shall be paid tor at SattJernant by [ • ] Qtiywt ]A Seller
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable tim*,
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that
the items referenced in Sections 1.1, 8.4 and 10.2 ("the tem$M) are respectively prwent, repairedlchangod as agreed, and
in the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair
the Items or, with the consent of Buyer* (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount At Settlement to provide for the same.
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item Is not as represented, athall not constitute a
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the Items as represented,
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Selter agrees, that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the pr\or written consent of Buyer, (a) no changes in any existing leases snail be made;
(b) no new leases shall &* antered Into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvement* to the Property shell be made or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust estate, limited liability company, or
other entity, tne person executing this Contract on its bthatf warrants his or her authority 1O do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT This Contract together with Its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties, and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check applicant* box)
[ J SMALL
•£?Q MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation, If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through
a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If
mediation fells, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15
shall prohibit any party trom seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.

16. DEFAULT If Buyer defaults, Setter may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or
to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contractor pursue other remedies available at law. if Seller defaults,
in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or punsufc other
remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to
Buyer upon demand It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer Is not a default and is governed by
Section 2.3(b).
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, ettomey fees snail not be awarded for
participation in mediation under Section 15.
1 * . NOTICED Except us provided in Section 23, all nonces required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed
by the party giving notice; and (c) receded by the other party or th» other party's agent no later than the applicable date
referenced in this Contract
19. ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not appty after Closing.
20. RISK Of LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its
Improvements- due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking In sminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed.
21, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Ttme Is of the essence regarding the dates aet forth in this Contract Extensions must
be agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise expficitfy stated in this Contract: <a) performance under aach
Section of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5;00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date;
and (b) the term *daysM shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which
triggers the timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance. Notice of loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates end linnets referenced
herein shall not be binding upon tltie companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract except as
otherwise agreed to in writing by such non-party.
22, FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda ant counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23, ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer ar counteroffer of the other,
(a) signs the- offar or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the
othfrf party's agent that lh* offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES, feuyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
{&) Loan Application & tree Deadline
(by Seller Disclosure Deadlint
(c) Evaluations & Inspection* Deadline
(d> Loan Denial Deftdlint

A/M/PIL

(Date)

.£.//<?/pSr-

(Date)

^/*L2dk8l
Af**,±
( gapg-

(Date)
(Date)

(©) Apttratal Deadline
(f) Settlement DeadHns CTt\

Peg* S of $ pages
$f96 R*v &J03

<yy^

Seller's Initials

ltd.

- (Date)

Dnte6#—&L"^»(

Buyer's Initials

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer otters TO purchase ihe Property on Tta abdK/e terms
rms and conditions.
l^Sellc* does not accept this ofler by:
^ : * &
I ) AM [J PNJ Mountain "nme on J*?
femXi(Date), tM* offer
/shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest h/Vorfev Deppsit to Buyer.
* ?

(Offti D f

ff&^

(lk*e
ttiOOftor

{Buy*r»- N»lWf)

(PLEASE PRIHT)

i^

ft*Wrt!r?c#

(tartce Addrett}

"15SjTof

Date"

Cttp Coo*)

*Pmrt«>)

ACCEF>fANCBCOUMTEROFFeftm^EC"nON
.CHEpK ONE:
[ H ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE; Salter Accepts the foregoing otter on the terms and conditions
v
specified above.
^ I ' f t O l J W I E=R©PPB*l: Seller presents tor Buyer's- Acceptance the terms of Buyer's after subject to the exceptions or
modifications a* specified in the attached ADDENDUM N Q . _
„

7&M<Jf/s*+-~d2^& .^^-nz-asr
( M f t ' J agnoUire^

fSebw*1 Mpmee)

<D»ta)

{TV*,

<PLEA*e raw?)

.... ........ •
( £ * * ( ' » Siottfttufv)

(No^iC* A M ' * * * )

:
(Dfirt*)

(Zip cod »)

(Tims)

<Phftf>»i

[ J REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing ofter.
(Dutf)

(&«tar » Siyntfun^

{T*\e)

(Sear's SUgtuuuro)

(D*tft)

(Turn)

r * » » » * » » » » » » « » * * * W* »TT * * * * * * * * * * * **»•»«•

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
^ t e law require* Bnoker to famish Buyer and Seflej^tfjth copter ofjhis Contract bearing alk signatures. (Fil in applicable
section below.}
^ s .
~
A/H.acknowledge
ft
knowledge receipt
recelpjt of
oj Affinal
&firiat copy of the foiegoing
C o W ^ beating all riaria]

fS*tar*i Signilufej

(Do*)

(5*rt*fe Sljrwujre)

(0*tiy)

B l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ]faxed [ ] mailed { ] hand
delivered on
.
(Date), postage prepaid, to the I I Seller [ J Buyer
Sent/Delivered by (specify).

TWTS FORM APPROVED * Y TMC UTAH REAL MTATC COMMISSION AND THE OFftCS o r TflEUIAJt AfTOW^gs^aEfrgftAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST *, JOta IT REFLACEG AMD SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED V^RaiOHS OP T H I B F O R f e ^
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Setter'* I n i t i a l .

Buyer1* Initiate

P»g«
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ADDENDUM NO.
T O

»M^«r»Y

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS PKH/] ADDENDUM [ lCOUin^jgppFBRtp^hiat REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (th«j'REPC-) with
an Orter W ^ < » j y t o s i r f _ , — n J Jri/JJQsL
, Including All prior atfjtenda and countoroffers,
bertareem Xf\(&WMVi
T V i M y F^**£*lr
as Buyer, and — > ^ H ^ ^ ^ y v ^ , C rrD^-JL .
« s Sutler,
regarding the Property located at ,
£&&&£+* > / ^ Z ^ ^ ^ f e ^ t ^ ,
The
fofiowlng terms are hereby Incorporated 8$ partltf life RE PC*

£cS/ur-h

Art i*> /?fitf?+.Jy

<Zcv~ise. y •<• tJ

>j- (jfj

i>v ^-tg-Z/tf/-"

j ^ r -

t?J>t-«-*-r^ . ?/*?-£« J

'

'

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): f J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED A8 FOLLOWS:

To the wctent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including eH prtor addenda-^™* counteroffers, these terms shall control. AB other twmsoMhe REPC, including all odor addenda and counteroffers.
rfot modified by this ADDENDUM final remain the same. [ ) SfeJItor [ ] Buyer shall h«v& until
[ ) AM [ ] P M
'Mountain Time or „
{DateLtoaccept the terms of ms ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions at Section
23 orlhe REPC. LJnlsss so accepteff, the after are set forth ih this ADDENDUM i

'•v^r-jasryr^
jB w

I )Setei Signature'

Date

Tint*

[

Yjfovm \ ytd^hfthun

"»K

Tiro*

ACCEPTANCE/COUMTE^OFPERmEJECTlON
CHECK ONE:
ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller [ ) Buyer hereby accepts theiwrns of thte ADDENDUM.
[

J COUNTEROFFER:
Buyer prasw
presets a* a counteroffer m* terms of attached ADDENDUM NO
COUNTEROFFER [ ] Seller [ ] BUyer

[

1 REJECTION: [ ) Seller'[ J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

THIS F W M AP^rtOVED BY t H E UTAH RCAL ESTATE CONWHSSION AND TMtt OFFICE OF THg UTAH ATTOfcNSY GENERAL,
EFrfcCTiVE AUOUSf 6. 2«J^, IT RfEPt,ACBL5 AND fiUPl^S£De& ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVEiD VERSIONS OF THIS FORI*.
UARFormZ
ft^*«wiivoci

—L v-^

H

ADDENDUM NO.

Pay /

/^JZ> „

ofjl^
.*.

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

«««*

THIS IS AH [^ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER totoai REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC) with
an C ^ r Reference Date a f — —«»„
Z2ff/&JT
ineturiinffj]iiprinr ^ d e n d a ^ p counteroffer^ between
^ ^ f t * w y t y - J ^ j j U ^]I<YT\
as^uver, and
a$ Setter,
r ^ / ^ « » f * / g ^ , j £ f e J ^ .
regarding th* Property located at
Qr^P
faSri
\ 7 ffm 7* 7
.
Th*
v^/>^r^L^
following terms aro hereby incorporated ae part, ol the REPC:
7

1. OPTION TO KEEP HOUSE ON MARKET {TIME CLAUSE")
11 Right to Accept Othar Otters. Buyer and Sailer agree that Seller may continue to offer the Property for saia end
to accept other offers subject to the rights of Buyer I A provided below. K Seller accepts any such offers, Salter will notify
Buyer in writing within
OT^-C" ( / ) calendar days After gn^inn into Bueh a contract
1.2 Right to Remove Condition*, Buy»er *haII have
* &*\^. L*fhounj after receipt of Seller's written notice in
which to either: (a) agree in writing to remove from the REPC the following condition(e) (check applicable bo*ec):
txf Financing Condition; reappraisal Condition; yiEvaluations 8, Inspections; jMf Subjecttothe Sale of Buyers
rtesldftnaa: [ ] Other (explain): _ _ _ W i _ t a - ^ .
„
~--—-^^^^_
or (b) by teMIng to respond in writing to Sellers notice, allow the REPC to automatically become canceled, in which
instance, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer.
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX)! [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ } ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

To the extant theterm*;of ihte ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these tornic shall control All other tercm ojjhe REPC, including all prior addejjdagpd countetoffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM- shaU> remain the se>rne, j ^ S S l e r [ ) Buyer shall have until , , > r ^ L J AM V\ PM
Mountain Time on
><' fZ/fp/^..
(Date), to accept the term* of this ADDENDUM in accorded with
/Ohe provtekm of Section 23p^theJ$EPC, Unless so accept^tfheyd^^&et forth irOhiy ADDEI^tlM shall lapse.

P

Buyer [ j Seller Signature

(Date*(Time)

f^BuyjSffi 1Softer S t a t u r e

T

(Data)

(Tima)

ACCErHTU^E/COUKrefco!^^

(ACCEPTANCE: { J Sailer [ ] Buyer hereby accept* (he terms of this ADDENDUM.
I ) COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO,.
'?'%;/&{Ate** J$™JU,
(Signature)
(Date)

s?£-*J-a$r
(Time)

(Signature)

(Data)

(Tima)

(Date)

(Time)

I ] REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Signature)

(Da**)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS POM* APPROVED BY THE UTAHttftALESTATE COWI(l»«DN AND THE OFFICE OF THE UT*H ATTORNEY GENERAL.
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 20*3, IT REPLACE5 A N D SUP£Rft£0£8 A t L P&EVtOOSLY APPriOVEO VERHON& OF THIS FOfflK,

Peo* i of 1

Soiled IriklalQJL^j^jr

Burr's lfiMmls____"-
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ADDENDUM NO.
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

fmt

ADDENDUM [ ) COUNTEROFFER J
it REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
ai^^^ef^enceDa^f
^.
JPx/f /OS's including aJ^Pri or ^ddend^pqrf
counteroffers, between
irw5 count
re*-*. ,
, *ftd,
as Seller.
reoardmg the Property located at
QrtttC* <b f Z2jti£ZU^
, ^ _ . The
/^nertfUkx:
t
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:
1. SUBJECT TO SALE OF BUYER'S RESIDENCE
1.1 Subject to SHI* of Buyer's Ratldenc*. Buy&rs obJiaaWon to pwrchi
closing of the sal* of Buyer's residence located at: L *^&< S^T &s£&
(the -Residence") by 5500 P.M. <MST) on the , . , . _ / l t
day of
^
"R&stdence Closing Deadline*).

Is conditioned upon the

UiePrj

s

JSL£S8=:

.{the

1.2 Strtu*. Buyer [ ) DOES f V b o E S NOT have a signed contract far the sate of the Residence, Tte Residence
I 3 '5 CWf»5 NOT presently listerffar Bale through (provide name/addre$s/phone or real estate brokerage): Adair
jtitQfffV P.O. Box 271 / fM)1-3QQ-11ftB if the Residence Isjj^t now listed, It will be so listed on or before th»
Ragin
:d»Y of
E^-J^rr^-A^f^t
g^.CXffijSS Buyer win diligently pursue the closing of the sale
of the Residence.

T

1.3 Right to Cancel If the sale of the Residence is not closed by the Residence Casing Deadline, Buyer or Seller
may, within three calendar days after Die Residence Closing Deadline, cancel the REPC by providing written notice to the
other parry. In the event of such cancellation,toeEarnest Money Deposit shall be releasedtoBuyer, Buyer rrjay howeverr,
remove thla condition at amy time prior to the Residence Closing Deadline by providing written notice to Seller.
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ J REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ) ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict wHh any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these termsfchallcontrol. All other termjpf the REPC. including an prior addeojijLaad counteroffers,
not modified by thte ADDENDUM shM rerpain the earn*, y\ Sailer I Jfcuyershall have until S*^*
[ ] AM j\TpM
jntaln Time on
^/Jil/o/f
(Date), to acpapt the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with
Section 2<S$t1tetREPC. Unless so accfcRted, lije^otf^r-^T^t forth irvfffe ^DDENDljM shall lapse.

y^CHECKONE:
( ^ r ^ ^ A p C E P T A N C E : [ ] belter \ J Buyer hereby accepts me terms of this ADDENDUM.
y^CtHJHyEROrrCR: [ ] Seller [ ] Buy*r presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.;

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] REJECTION: [ \ Seller [ } ©uy*r rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THia poaw APPROVED a r THE UTAH R*AL eaTAte COWNWSICW AND THE OFFICE OF THE <UTAH ATTORNEY* GENERAL,

CPPCCniVE AUGU8T S. 2002. IT REPLACE* AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THte PORK.
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ADDENDUM NO. 4
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

fetw*

TH»S IS AN fX] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of February 1. 20flfi Including all prior addends and counteroffers, between £Uut as Buyer,
and SlQDfe a* Seller, regarding the Property located at 6006 S . 7100 W. Hooper. Utah B4315. The following terms
nr* hartby incorporated as part of the REPC:
1). T h e confirmation of agency disclosure referenced in section 5 of the R.E.P.C, shall be charged

as follows; The Listing agent shalLfre MiKe Bowman and the listing broker shall bg Realty Link, LI 0
who both represent the seller. The Selling agenland selling broker who represents the buver shall

pajnain..tti^5ampl
All, other .terms, to remain the same,
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [X] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
m
To tha extent the terms of this ADDENDUM m&dtty or conflict with any provision* of the REPC, Including all prior addenda
amd counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC including all prior addenda «nd counteroffers,
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller [XJ Buyer shall have until £:Q0 [ ] AW [X] PM
Mountain Time on Fetamary fl ?0QB (Date), to accept the terms or this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provislona
of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, thB offer as sert forth in thte ADDENDUM ahall lapse.

fTjOMtMi .dTjThC
[ ] Buyer [ft Seller Signature

-

_

(Date) (Tim*) f ] Buyer [ J Belief Signature
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFERfflEJICTION

(Date)

CHpCKONE:
/
/ y f ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller V/\ Buyer hereby acraptMh^rm* of this ADDENDUM.

(Time)
"N.

x

/ / ^ C O U N T E R O F F E R ; L t o a l i e A J Buyar presents as /ccforfebffer the term™? attached ADDENDUM NO. ,

•6d3^uiv-j^i Woe [TI^^F
\

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

i

Uffiaturef/

^^

x£r

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

"[-J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoii

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THi UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND TH£ OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE AUGUSTft,2003, rf RBPLACKS AND SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF Trfl* FORK,

\
\
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Addendum No. 4toREPC

^ ^

Pug*
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ADDENDUM HO.^T^^^^

ac_

LSJ

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN Y\ ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of,
including; ait prior addends and counteroffers,
between
JPlrtrTT^L
a* Buyer, and
C/^'V£iL.
as Seller,
regarding the Property located at
—_
_
The
following terms are hereby incorpcwatftd as pert of the REPC;

pern 8* — / f f r f / y - ^ U

(7^>^jr

rt***^

?U~ s*-*nt .

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADLINES REFEREHCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED [ J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:

-

To the axtent the terms of tills ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including att prbr addenda and counteroffers, these terms shall control. AH othertermsof the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers,
not modified by thfeADDENIDUM&liaJI remain the same, ( \ SelkK^ ] Buyer shall have until
[ ]AM[ JPW
^fountain Time on
(Dale), to accept thetermsof W& ADDENDUM Mi accordance with the provisions of Section
/jWkoftt»eREPCX Unless so speptjd, the oiler as set forth mp)\s APpENDUW ^ H J
[/Buyer [ |$e«er Striatum

DM*

TW

/
^-

—

ACCEPTAWCE/COU«TERC?Ff£a/REJECTSON

CHECK ONE
\'/\
[

ACCEPTANCE: [ ] S*l»€r [ ] Buyvr hereby accepts thetermsof this ADDENDUM.
1 COUNTEROFFER: [ j S e l w [ ] Buyer piesents as a counteroffer thetermsof attached ADDENDUM NO..

feipnituet)

I

(Date)

(Dmef

(5ipn*k«^)

(Data)

(n™}

pat*)

(rirrWl)

] REJECTION: f J Sailer [ J Buyer rejects theforegoingADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Data)

(Time)

(Sipnaton*)

THIS f ORW APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE CQJHWSSKM AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
EFFECTIVE AUGUST E, 2001. IT REPLACES AND SUPERCEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORK.
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ADDENDUM C

Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement
BECITALS
This action was commenced In the Second Judicial District Courr of Weber
County, State of Uteh, by Plaintiff, Marieen Stone, in which she sought eviction of
Defendants ana Counter Plaintiffs, Richard and Judy Flint, from leased property
pursuant to claims of waste. The Defendants responded to this allegation and brought
counter claims against the Plaintiff on three grounds:
1,
2,
3,

Trespass
Breach of Contract and/or Conversion
Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (i.e., property warranty)

Pursuant to the following Settlement Agreement, STONE expressly agrees to
drop her lawsuit against FLINT and FLINT agrees to drop the First Cause of Action,
Trespass, from the suit, These items will be dismissed with prejudice within seven (7)
days of signing this agreement, The parties herein stipulate that the only remaining
issues for the court are whether three (3) sheds and several non-fixed mobile panels on
STONFS property are part of a Bill of Sale and Real Estate Purchase Contract, both
dated 16 April 2008.
This Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement shall
hereinafter be referred to as the "Agreement,"

1.
RICHARD AND JUDY FLINT (FLINT), their heirs, successors,
administrators, agents and representatives, shall hereinafter be referred to, jointly and
individually, separately and collectively, as FLINT,
2,
MARLENE STONE her partners, parents, subsidiaries, divisions,
branches, and affiliates (the foregoing shall be collectively referred to as STONE), and
each of their incorporators, directors, officers, owners, shareholders, servants, agents,
employees, former employees, attorneys and representatives, and the successors,
heirs and assigns of each of the foregoing, and any person, pannership, corporation,
association, organization or entity now or previously acting, directly, in the interest of or
on behalf of MARLENE STONE shall hereinafter he rBierred to, jointly and Individually,
separately and collectively, as STONE.

3,
The parties hereby agree to stipulate that the legal ownership of the sheds
and non-fixed mobile panels are the sole and remaining issues which are scheduled for
a trial on 15 April 2009.

H t H - W - ™ lUt UB'.dy All l a i
U
Mu«„uu C rn )IOU i. « ouiabn

U1 inic
0013899354

HM NO. BOH MU1
02/02/ ti]Q9 15:10

^
^
R34D P.0Q2/OD5

4.
On 1 January 2009, the parties agree that FLINT removed aff animals,
belongings, materials, farm equipment, and any other personal property belonging to
FLINT from off of the property of STONE, which is the subject of a lease dated 16 April
20D8 (15 acres adjoining and on the North and East of the FLINT property),
5.
It is expressly acknowledged that white the duration of said lease was
from 17 April 2008 to 17 April 2009, the lease expired per agreement of the parties
effective on 2 January 2009,
6.
STONE herein agrees to pay FLINT the sum of $559.00 for the prorated
remainder of the lease ($569 - $1,889,25/yr + 365 days/yr x 108 days remaining for
lease period) within seven (7) days of the signing of this Agreement by the parties. This
number will be further reduced by an amount of $40 per month for each month that the
horse walker remains on STONE'S property. The parties agree that $80 of the above V
sum will be withheld from the $559 payment listed above to ensure such $40 per month
payment for a period of two months.
7.
The parties hereby agree not to disparage one another, specifically
including statements about the other to neighbors, friends, or church members af the
FLINTS; further, the parties mutually agree to keep the terms and conditions of this
agreement confidential, subject to the exceptions in-numbered paragraph 23 below.
8.
STONE hereby acknowledges and agrees to the terms and conditions of
the Joint Motion for Stipulated Temporary Injunction (I.e. three years, or until STONE
sells her property* which ever is longer) and the proposed Order submitted to the court
that is attached hereto,
9.
It Is hereby acknowledged that there Is a horse walker that is located on
the STONE'S real property but which is the property of FLINT pursuant to a 16 April
2008 Real Estate Purchase Contract and accompanying Bill of Sale of the same date.
This statement is in no way an admission concerning the rightful ownership of the
loafing sheds or any remaining property on the STONE'S land and which the FLINTS
cialm an interest in by virtue of said contracts.
10.
FLINT agrees to remove said horse walker by 30 January 2009. FLINTS
also agrees to cap the electrical line to the pasture electrical fence also by said date
and STONE agrees to cap and/or sever any connections from her electric fence that go
onto the FLINTS' property by said date,
11.
It is expressly agreed that STONE shall have no nght to any utilities
presently existing on her property but that are attached and/or coming from the FLINT
property, This includes, but is not limited to, any electrical, water or sewer. It is
expressly agreed that the electrical lines for the horse walker will remain underground*
As part of the deconstmction and/or movement qf the horse walker, FLINT herein
agrees to cap the exposed electrical lines and bury them underground where they

/
currently exist. Furthermore, FLINT agrees to disconnect the electncal line to the horse
walker, at the point it comes above ground on FLINT'S property.

V

12.
To the extent there are other issues to work out between the parties
regarding the ownership or right to use utilities, including but not limited to gas,
electrical, irrigation or potable water lines on either party's property, this Agreement
does not address such Issues which am not currently before the court.
13.
The parties hereby expressly agree to comply with the requirements of the
court with respect to contact with one other.
14.
parties.

This Agreement constitutes a partial settlement of the claims between the

15*
The parties acknowledge that their properties adjoin each other and that
for signrficant sections of the property line there is no fence, or there are fences or other
structures traversing through the mutual property tine. As a result, the parties recognize
that there will be continued need in the future to resolve disputes either between these
parties or their successors in interest.
16. This Agreement in no way affects the property rights of the parties with
respect to either real property or personal property not at issue in this current lawsuit.
This includes, but is not limited to, FLINTS' tnteresi in two or more shares of Irrigation of
the Wilson Hooper Water line purchased by the FUNTS from STONE. However, it Is
the intent of the parties T.o work together through their respective counsel to resolve any
future disputes concerning the common property lines and the structures that may be in
common as well.

•
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17.
Each party will bear their own attorney's fees and costs tor all matters
settled herein. The parties expressly reserve the right to request the fees and costs for
litigation for the remaining issue concerning the ownership interest of the loafing sheds.
18.
This release Is purposefully broad, and it is Intended to capture any
conceivable claim which the parties have against each other or their agents excluding
these specifically preserved herein.
19.
The parties warrant and represent that they have not sold, assigned,
granted, or transferred to any other person, corporate or natural, any claims
encompassed by this Agreement that he has, had, or may have at any time in the
future, or claims to have or have had against the other party.
20.
All negotiations relating to this Agreement are merged herein, There are
no promises, agreements, conditions, undertakings, warranties, or representations, oral
or written, express or implied, among FLINT and/or STONE as to such matters other
than as set forth herein, No waiver, change, or modification of this Agreement shall be
valid unless the same Is In writing and is signed by the party to be bound thereby.

[/

^

21.
The singular number, when used herein, includes the plural, and viceversa, as the context may require. The masculine, feminine, and neutral genders shall
include such other genders as are appropriate.
22.
If any term or other provision of this Agreement is invalid, illegal, or
incapable of being enforced by any rule of law or public policy, all other conditions and
provisions of this Agreement nevertheless shall remain in full force and effect.
23.
The confidentiality provisions of this Agreement shall not, however, apply
to prevent STONE or FLINT from advising its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial
advisors, and/or government tax agencies of the settlement of the claims and the
consideration received therefore. To the extent that FLINT or STONE; disclose such
Information to Its attorneys, tax return preparers, financial advisors, andyor government
tax agencies, they shall advise those persons of the confidentiality provisions of this
Agreement. Nothing herein prevents the parties from disclosing this agreement, Its
terms and conditions, In litigation, in a court of law, or In an alternative dispute
resolution proceeding,
24.
The parties agree to maintain and/or not remove survey stakes or markers
on their property. This is not a ratification cf said survey, or a waiver of any claim or
right, but merely a good faith agreement to maintain the alleged boundary for the
benefit of both parties to this agreement. To the extent that such markers or stakes
have bean removed by STONE'S animals or otherwise, the parties agree to replace the
same if the original location is known to them and it is located on their Individual
property, This does not give either party the right to trespass onto the other's property
to move or replace a stake.
25.
This Agreement shall in all respects be interpreted, enforced, and
governed by and under the laws of the State of Utah. The parties agree to pay all
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in enforcing this Agreement,
26.
This Agreement contains the entire agreement, understanding and
stipulation between the parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are contractual,
and not a mere recital, and may be enforced in court Any waiver by STONE or FLINT
of a breach or violation of any provision of this Agreement shall not be construed as a
waiver of any other provision or of any subsequent breach or violation of the
Agreement. • This Agreement is deemed to have been drafted jointly by the parties.
Any uncertainty or ambiguity shall not be construed for or against any party based on
attribution of drafting to any party.
27.
The parties are encouraged to consult with an attorney of their choice
before signing this Agreement.
28.
The parties agree that they are entering into the Agreement knowingly,
willingly, and voluntarily, and that no promises, representations, or Inducements not
expressly set forth herein were made to them that caused them to sign the Agreement.
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THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE READ AND FULLY
UNDERSTAND THE MEANING AND INTENT OF ALL OF THE PROVISIONS AND
TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE FINAL BINDING EFFECT.
WITNESS my signature on this &(r\/}

day of

M.

2009.

Q/a/d^

iand Flint

Date

/
tT

1

'jWx
arisen Stone

Date

£U£-

DateT

/

'
/

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Tel.: (801) 394-4573
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,

JOINT MOTION FOR STIPULATED
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 080907234
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Defendants.
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Counterclaimants,

•J T 7 /) ~J /
Judge: Michael D. Lyon

vs.
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5,
Counterdefendants.
Come now Defendants/Counterclaimants (hereinafter "Defendants"), Richard
Flint and Judy Flint, by and through counsel, David Stevenson, and
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant (hereinafter "Plaintiff), Marlene Stone, by and through'
counsel, Isaac Macfariane, and moves the Court for a temporary injunction by
stipulation of the parties and requests that an injunction issue enjoining
Counterdefendant, Marlene Stone, and/or her agents from the following:
1.

From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in
Hooper, Utah, and having serial number Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is

enjoined from being on any part of Defendants' property, including, but not
limited to, their driveway and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their
porch, and/or their home.
2.

Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police
officer.

3.

From parking or driving on Defendants' property.

4.

From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq.
By stipulation, the parties motion that the Court issue a temporary injunction

through the attached order, and that said injunction exist for three years or until such
time as Plaintiff sells her adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of
Defendants' property, whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item
listed above.

(pNSONJI S W H , P.C.

/

)A/
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David B. Stevenson
Attorneys for Richard and Judy Flint
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4-c-

QJhA

C. Macfarlane
ftorney for Marlene Stone

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Tel.: (801) 394-4573
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,

ORDER FOR TEMPORARY
INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 080907234
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Defendants.
RICHARD FLINT AND JUDY FLINT,
Counterclaimant,

Judge: Michael D. Lyon

vs.
MARLENE STONE and Does 1-5,
Counterdefendants.
The parties, Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint and Plaintiff Marlene Stone,
by and through their respective counsel, having moved the Court for a temporary
injunction by stipulation, and having found good cause for issuing said termporary
injunction, it is therefore ORDERED and DECREED that Plaintiff, Marlene Stone,
and/or her agents are temporarily enjoined:
1.

From trespassing on Defendants' property, located at 6006 S. 7100 West in
Hooper, Utah, and having Serial # 10-124-0001. Plaintiff is enjoined from being
on any part of Defendants' property, including, but not limited to, their driveway

and unpaved surfaces, private sidewalk adjoining their porch, and/or their home.
2.

Plaintiff is enjoined from contacting Defendants in any way, including, but not
limited, direct in-person contact, over the telephone, through the internet, at their
places of employment, or otherwise. This also includes any contact through an
agent of the Plaintiff, except for Plaintiff's attorney, real estate agent, or police
officer.

3.

From parking or driving on Defendants' property.

4.

From any stalking behavior, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101 et seq.
Said injunction shall exist for three years or until such time as Plaintiff sells her

adjoining property lying immediately to the North and East of Defendants' property,
whichever is longer, and with respect to each and every item listed above.

Judge Michael D. Lyon

ADDENDUM D

A

No.

Q

Okay.

A

I probably would have if I knew for sure they were

going to be there or be somewhere else.
MR. STEVENSON:

Your Honor, would you give me just a

second?
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. STEVENSON:

No further questions for this

witness.
THE COURT:
MR.

NEELEY.

THE COURT:
MR.

Okay

Do you have any other questions?

Your Honor, I have no other qu estions.
Okay •

NEELEY •

The only thing I would prof f er is in

regar d to al:torney fees .

I would prefer to file an affidavit

with the court, if that becomes an issue.
THE COURT:

counsel?

Okay

Would you like to do the s ame,

You didn 't off er any testimony r egarding your fees.

I'll allow you the same opportunity if you want to do it that
way.
MR. STEVENSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

And I wou Id like to

offer a mot ion as <a matt er of law, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

23

MR.

Go a head.

STEVENSON:

Okay.

Your Honor, I don 't want to

24 i

waste: the court's time in going back over the items that have

25

alreaidy bee n discussed.

But the defendant and

1QC,

counter-plaintiff in this case would ask the court to
consider a motion as a matter of law on a couple of bases:
One, that first the contract

itself, the plain language of

the contract includes all the loafing sheds and all of the
panels.
THE COURT:
6006 South.

All the loafing sheds on the property at

That's what the

MR. STEVENSON:

Yes.

contract says.
That's what the contract says.

And, at the time prior to the sale, that constituted all of
the -- that was the property

for both sides.

And the

contract that was entered in -THE COURT:

The Bill of Sale was made contemporaneous

with the sale of the real property, doesn't it?
MR. STEVENSON:

Yes.

And that matched verbatim to

the original REPC that also had the same language.

It's

intended from the beginning, Your Honor, we believe
THE COURT:
counsel?

—

They weren't buying all 17 acres,

They were only buying 2 acres?
MR. STEVENSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

The evidence that's

been put on so far has, we believe, will show as a matter of
law that the language is plain on its face and that the four
corners, the intent from looking at the four corners of this
document so that Miss Stone intended to include the horse
walker and all panels and sheds.

And even if this court does

not so find that the plain language is unambiguous, the

196

evidence that's been proffered today shows that as a matter
of law that the, that there is ample evidence that shows the
parties' intent through panels, gates, parole evidence and
the documents in this manner to satisfy the elements of a
breach of contract action and conversion.
In addition, our clients put on evidence of damages for
both of those causes of action, including mentioning that he
wished to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs and interest
in this action.

For these reasons, we would ask the court to

rule in our favor on a motion as a matter of law.
THE COURT:
advisement.

I'm going to take your motion under

We are going to -- I would like to have a chance

to go through all of the evidence before I rule on either of
your motions.

What I anticipate is that I'll give you a

chance to come back and to further oral argue everything, if
you would like.

I didn't anticipate that just what you made

was now your closing argument.

Do you want anything further

to say?
MR. STEVENSON:

Your Honor, I don't believe it's

necessary to do any further closing argument at this point.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Neeley, what is your intent?

MR. NEELEY: Well, Your Honor, I assumed that we were
coming back based on what the court said.

I think you wanted

us to take a look at the law and argue points and law to the
court and relate that to the facts of the case.

So, I guess

i 01

April 20, 2009.

Ogden, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, folks.

MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT:

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Record may show this is the time set for

oral arguments in the matter of Marlene Stone vs. Richard and
Judy Flint.
Since this is your counterclaim and you have the
burden, I'll allow you to go first.
MR. STEVENSON:

Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor,

first, we just appreciate the chance to make one final legal
argument.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. STEVENSON:

And, Your Honor, because there is two

issues here, first is whether the contract itself was
ambiguous then, second, if it was, what the facts were in
this case.

I'm planning on just reciting after we discuss,

first, some of the key facts in this case and why you should
rule in favor of the Flints, Your Honor.
Your Honor, this is simply a contract
issue that the court has to decide.

interpretation

And, first, the question

is, was the contract, the Bill of Sale and the REPC, did it
give, did it define the personal property that was to go with
the real property?

Or did the initial contract, was it

undefined as to both?

That's one of the questions that the

?nc,

court has to determine.
Your Honor, this court should find, first, that the
Bill of Sale and the REPC which stated that all sheds and
4 I

panels, waterers, feeders, the horse walker, that we would

5

assert to the court, that this is -- this is something,

6

certainly, something the court could find as unambiguous.

7

The court could find that when it says "all" in the context

8

of the property being sold when it was unidentified, where

9

the property was, that it intended to include all the

10

personal property regardless of whether the entire real

11

property was included in the sale.

12

Secondly, there's been -- let me point out the three

13

cases I believe that identify this point and give, I guess,

14

some direction to the court on determining which way to go.

15

First is the Flores vs. Earnshaw case which we discussed last

16

week, which specifies simply that when you are doing a contract

17

interpretation, the meaning intent, when interpreting the

18

meaning intent, you consider the provisions in relation to all

19

others.

20

the intentions are determined from the plain meaning as a

21

matter of law.

22

Where the language of the four corners is unambiguous,

If it is ambiguous, then the court considers

23

extrinsic evidence.

The question really is under that case

24

law, is this section, this Bill of Sale and REPC.

25

capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of

Is it

1

uncertain meanings and terms, missing terms or other facial

2

deficiencies?

3

fairly clear in this case that all, referring to all panels

4

and all sheds, did refer to all those items that were

5

potentially in sale.

6

that point.

7 I

And, Your Honor, we would assert that it seems

The real property was not determined at

Second case that we believe comes into play is Spears

&

vs. Warr, which was partially abrogated with regard io its

9

standard of review.

But, basically, Spears vs. Warr stood for

10

the proposition that you can't enter in parole evidence unless

11

there is an ambiguity in the final documents, or there exists,

12

the existence of rights which are collateral to the original

13

contract.

14

Now, it's unclear whether Flores vs. Earnshaw changes

15

that in any way, but to the extent that law still applies,

16

and it doesn't appear that the supreme court has overturned

17

it on that principle, we urge the court to find that, I guess

18

when it boils down to it, was there ambiguity in the final

19

documents?

20

Bill of Sale?

21

that there is, there is more than one interpretation that can

22

be made here.

23

Was there ambiguity in either the REPC or the
And I guess, Your Honor, I think it's clear

One interpretation is that Miss Stone actually gave

24

up every bit of personal property regardless of where her

25

real property lied.

Another --

THE COURT:

Let me ask a question about that.

2I

look at the REPC, and clause

3

items,1' it says, "Unless excluded herein, this sale includes

4

the following items that are presently owned and attached to

5

the property."

6
7I

1.1 is entitled

As I

"Included

The property, of course, is not all 17 acres, is it?
It's just the 2 acres that they were purchasing.

Because up

above, on paragraph one, it says the property is 6006 South
7100 West.

Also described as 2 acres with a barn -- horse

lOt

barn and a hay barn.

11

the scope of what is the property that the parties are

12

contracting for?

13I

that's the property, it's the 2 acres, it's not the 17 acres

14

and, therefore, when you get down to 1.1 where it's the

15

included items that are attached to the property, and the

16

property being 2 acres, not 17 acres, how do you then, you

17

know, reach out and include personal property that's not part

18

of the sale of the real property?

19

So, as I read that, doesn't that narrow

And, therefore, when you talk -- so, if

MR. STEVENSON:

Your Honor, the other 15 acres

20

besides the 2 acres, I don't think there's much dispute that

21

beyond the items that are in question here, those aren't

22

generally out on the horse pasture.

23

just not in that area.

24

been provided as part of the record, the 15 acres, with the

25

exception of the 66 feet right-of-way, there is nearly

Those aren't —

that's

If you look at the pictures that have

nothing out there.

It's -- all of these items, if you and I

were to look at them out the window, they are going to look
very close, all of the gates and panels.
THE

COURT:

Sure.

MR. STEVENSON: And the sheds, they are going to look
very close.

ItTs not like you have a couple sheds that are

together, then others that are several acres away.
that, Your Honor.

It's not

The other 15 acres, essentially, has no

other buildings on it.

So, Your Honor, I guess the first

question on whether the original Bill of Sale and whether the
REPC is unambiguous, I guess, we are going to have to concede
that, at least, at least it is subject to the interpretation,
you know, other than one way to see it.
Of course, my client's testimony means all, means
all.

They looked at all the items of personal property were

supposed to be included in the sale.

Evidence of that as

shown in the trial was that the statement of Joe Adair that
all these items are included.

It all goes.

statement, you know, that it all stays.
additional —

Her, the

Then there was an

there was testimony put on that Mrs. Flint

spoke directly about each item with Mrs. Stone.

Well, the

question is, what would have been an absolutely unambiguous
statement if the REPC or the Bill of Sale were perfectly
unambiguous, what would, it have included?
have said all six sheds.

It probably would

It would have said all 30 panels

1

instead of just three that the Flints ended up getting.

It

2

would have said panels or, I guess, gates.

3

have said all personalty or farm equipment including, then it

4

listed the same items.

It probably would

5

I think, Your Honor, if there was a way to make it

6

completely unambiguous, that would have made it completely

7

unambiguous.

8

interpretation, we do feel that the court, you know, both

9

Spears vs. Warr and Flores vs. Earnshaw point to the fact

So, to the extent there is a possible other

10

that if there is some ambiguity, then you could look at

11

parole evidence.

12

In this case, because the client, I mean the

13

plaintiff and counter-defendant, is challenging the contract

14

to the degree saying the contract didn't state that you get

15

all the panels, it didn't state that you get all of the

16

sheds, now we have to put on parole evidence of it.

17

me ask first, Your Honor, to take note of the things that the

18

plaintiff and counter-claimant didn't, did not put on.

19

And let

They didn't put on any evidence that there was a

20

condition precedent.

They didn't say the items of personal

21

property listed are subject to a survey.

22 J

Second, they didn't produce the agent or broker to refute the

9

evidence that we put on through a broker and two other parties

It didn't say that.

24 1 Third, their agent nor Miss Stone corrected the Bill of Sale.
25

They didn't correct the former REPC.

They didn't correct the

1

five addendums.

2

There is multiple opportunities to correct these issues if

3

that's not what she intended.

4

panels and all the sheds, she had an opportunity to correct

5

them.

6

In fact, the parties have five addendums here,

If she didn't intend all the

She didn't sue to collect the two feeders.
And, Your Honor, this might seem like a small thing,

7

but this is fairly important.

8

that showed that two of the feeders were actually on her

9

property.

10

There was substantial evidence

She didn't dispute --

THE COURT:

Did I miss -- as I am recalling, I

11

thought she said the feeders were on her property.

12

understand they have a different view, but wasn't that her

13

testimony?

14

MR. STEVENSON:

Yes, Your Honor.

I

Why I say

15

substantial evidence, and the weight, at least, this goes to

16

the weight of the evidence, there was three parties that said

17

this was clearly on her property.

18

to get it back or claim that it's not theirs.

19

THE COURT:

And she hasn't sued to try

Can't she also -- apart from that, is

20

there anything inconsistent with putting it even in the same

21

category as the horse walker?

22

was within the right-of-way, but it was the wiring was

23

connected to the barn.

24

that, especially, when she knew that he wanted it very badly.

25

And she testified that between the time of their first visit

I mean, the horse walker, it

And, therefore, made sense to leave

and the return of Mr. Adair with the contract she had talked
to her children about that, and they had decided just to let
the horse walker go.

So, what's inconsistent with saying I'm

41

going to give you these things even though they are not

5

within the property?

6|

that?
MR. STEVENSON:

Is there anything inconsistent with

Well,

first, Your Honor, my

recollection of the facts on that point are different.
9 I

I had

to pin her down after that, because she first said, no, we

10

didn't talk about any of the individual items.

11

only when Mr. Adair came later that same day that they viewed

12

it for the very first time she admitted that she saw that the

13

horse walker was even listed.

14

discussion with her children prior to seeing that.

15

had a discussion with them after she saw that the horse

16

walker was listed.

17

And it was

So, she didn't have the
Maybe she

The only testimony that was had concerning what was

18

discussed was two items.

One, it appears that Miss Judy

19

Flint said they discussed each item.

20

Flint and Joe Adair said, you know, both gave common

21

statements that she said it all goes.

22

there was a discussion about the horse walker individually,

23

like Miss Judy discussed, if there was a discussion, there

24

was a discussion about all of the items, not just -- not just

25

them in general.

And then, both Richard

So, her -- she did --

And to the extent that

1

THE COURT:

2|

MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT:

Did s h e s a y
What's

that?
that?

Did s h e s a y

4I

MR.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. STEVENSON: Yes, Miss Flint said they discussed

7 J each item.

STEVENSON:

Did M i s s

that?
Flint

say

that?

Yes.

So, in essence, Your Honor, if you look at it

from our standpoint, the easiest thing for someone to say
9 I

that has decided they got a bad deal, that things didn't turn

10

out the way they wanted them to, is to say, well, I never

11

intended that.

12

That wasn't part of the deal.

Well, apparently, you know, Miss Stone's testimony

13

was simply, we didn't discuss it beforehand.

14

the REPC.

15

property outside of my boundary.

16

because, certainly, the feeders and the horse walker were

17

within her newly defined boundary.

18

months later that she finally even learned where the boundary

19

was.

20

include these items when she didn't know where the boundary

21

was.

22

And 1 signed

I never intended to include any other personal
Well, she can't say that

Not only that, it was two

So, it would be very difficult for her to say I didn't

Now, the other issue, she didn't, I wanted to point out

23

that Your Honor just mentioned, you mentioned that the

24

electrical for the horse walker comes over to my client's

25

property.

Now, I'll admit, I'm not a farmer.

And I don't know

what the price of a new horse walker is and what it takes to
put in all the cement work to even hold up one of these
behemoths, but a horse walker is not a small item.

If she

4 I wanted to be able to maintain use of it, she very easily could
5

have kept it.

6

THE COURT:

7I

MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT:

91

Could I interrupt you for just a minute?
Sure.

Yes, Your Honor.

Go ahead and finish your thought, then

I'll go back.
MR. STEVENSON:

10

I was going to say, Your Honor, her

11

stated intent as part of the hearing was that she wanted

12

to -- she planned to go ahead and develop the back property

13

and even to sell it and to develop it into, perhaps, lots.

14

If she had to put a road through there, it's entirely

15

consistent with the statement of Joe Adair and the statement

16

of Judy Flint and the statement of Richard Flint that she

17

intended for all of the personal property to go.

18

want it.

19

do that animal work anymore.

20

She didn't need the loafing sheds.

21

She got rid of her animals.

She didn't

She didn't intend to

She didn't need the panels.

Now, the first time that the issue even came up about

22

the panels and whether the panels were theirs was well after

23

this litigation began.

24

came up was well after the REPC and the Bill of Sale was

25

signed.

The first time that the sheds even

Testimony was it came up months later when she

finally wanted to kick them off her land.

Then, for the

first time, she had these other thoughts, I don't want to
have you -- you know.
right to them.

Those are mine and I am asserting a

So, at that point, she was asserting a right

under the contract saying, I never gave you that.

That's the

first time that my clients ever heard it.
So, the real question for Your Honor is, was the
personal property defined under the contract?
yes, it was.

We would say,

But to the extent there is possibly more than one

meaning, Your Honor.

You need to find that it was ambiguous

and allow the parole testimony that's already been added.
Now, as far as the parole testimony, I want to point
out the one thing that I think is clear.

And this court -- I

don't know that the other side can refute this.

The one thing

that is clear is that Miss Stone did not intend to just include
the property within the survey.
never intended that.

She never included that.

She

It's clear from both the original REPC,

the Bill of Sale, and the testimony from the other day, she
didn't include just the -- she didn't intend just the items
that were in the REPC and the Bill of Sale.

I'm sorry.

She

didn't mean to -- she wasn't just including the items as
defined by the survey.
And there is two things that point to that.

One,

Your Honor, first, is the property boundary under the map
that has a yellow line showed the original boundary and then

9 1 R

1

the modified boundary.

The original boundary didn't even

2

include the hay barn.

And if what she intended was to just

3

include certain items, she didn't know what she was going to

4

include.

5

at the original 2 acres.

6

it the other way, the 66 acres, then all of a sudden it

7

excludes three sheds and about 27 pieces of either fencing or

8

panels that my clients claim were part of the deal that were

9

mobile.

10

The hay barn would have been excluded if you looked
If you look at -- if you looked at

So, the one thing that we can, we do know is that Miss

11

Stone didn't intend to have just what's on their property per

12

the survey.

13

walker and feeders are in the same category.

14

that.

15

The horse walker and, especially, both horse

THE COURT:

They both prove

I'm looking at my notes from Mrs. Stone's

16

testimony.

And you can correct me, but my notes say that all

17

of the feeders were on the 2 acres at the time of the sale.

18

Did she not testify about that?

19

MR. STEVENSON:

I know my clients testified that two

20

of them were not, that they were on her property.

One of

21

them, Mr. Flint, specified that one was on the 66 foot

22

right-of-way and one was out in their pasture.

23

guess what we could do, if that point needs to be clarified,

24

we can certainly open up testimony again.

25

Miss Stone, I can't recall whether she refuted that or not.

So -- and I

I do believe that

1

My recollection is that if she addressed it, it was very,

2

very briefly.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. STEVENSON:

Okay.

Your Honor, I guess one other thing I

5

wanted to point out is Your Honor pointed us to another case

6

called Tangren Family Trust vs. Tangren.

7

parole evidence was precluded because the one party was

And, in that case,

seeking to have it admitted to show that the parties did not
9 | intend to have a valid contract and, secondly, to show that
10

the contract itself was subject to a condition precedent.

In

11 J this case, there is -- we don't have that similar
circumstance.

But what we do have is there is an absence of

13I

a condition precedent.

14

want to include in the Bill of Sale the items that are within

15

the surveyed lines, Your Honor, she could have put that in

16

there, been very easy for her to do it.

17

THE COURT:

If Miss Stone intended to say I only

How do you get around in this case the

18

merger clause that's in the contract?

In other words, even

19

assuming, looking at the evidence in a light most favorable

20

to your client, that contract was presented later in the day

21

after all these conversations had occurred in terms of what

22

goes with the property or what stays and all of those things?

23

And so, if you look at the purpose of the merger clause,

24

everything that is in terms of parole evidence is excluded

25

and you look at just the contract.

Isn't that a proper way

r>> -1

*~J

of looking at it?
MR. STEVENSON:

Yes, Your Honor, if there is no

ambiguity in the documents.

Your Honor, you cited to us the

Danes vs. Vincent case the other day and also the Tangren
case.

And the Earnshaw case actually cited to Danes and, I

think, clarified that it's the same exact standard, whether
the issue is the merger clause or, in our case, it's just a
facial ambiguity.

In fact, on page 4 of the Earnshaw case it

said, said the sole issue on appeal -- well, I can get just
right to the issue.

It refers to Danes.

And it says, "Once

the court determines that the term or provision is facially
ambiguous, it may determine the parties' intent through
examination of parole evidence, the determination of which
presents a question of fact."
THE COURT:

Let me stop you right there, though.

Looking just at the contract itself, without bringing in, you
know, the conversations that occurred upstairs in Mrs.
Stone's bedroom, and just looking at the contract, what about
the contract that is ambiguous?
MR. STEVENSON:

What is it that's ambiguous?

Your Honor, the statement "all."

It's either three or six panels.
THE COURT:

But isn't it —

yeah, three or six.

But

how many are on the property that's being sold?
MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT:

Well, at the time

—

Are there just three?

91 P

MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT;

2
3

MR. STEVENSON:

THE COURT:

There is only three

So, where is the ambiguity in the

contract then?
MR. STEVENSON:

8
9

Yes, Your Honor.

that are on the physical property.

6
7

Aren't there just three sheds on the

property that's being sold?

4
5

What's that?

items.

The ambiguity is found in several

One, when this contract was made, it says to

10

specify —

it says that there is going to be a survey that

11

occurs.

12

It says "all."

13

All right?

14

Sale that includes every item in the formal REPC, but the

15

Bill of Sale does not mention the hay barn.

16

mention the other animal barn.

It first says here's the items that are included.
Then it says there is going to be a survey.

Not only that, but then you have a final Bill of

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. STEVENSON:

It doesn't

I think --

That's not in dispute though, is it?
It's not in dispute, but it certainly

19

shows there is ambiguity between the Bill of Sale.

And there

20

is ambiguity between the REPC addendum, the REPC itself and

21

then the final Bill of Sale.

22

"all panels, all gates."

23

interpreted from the four corners, you look at the -- you

24

look at the four corners to determine the intent of the

25

parties.

The final Bill of Sale says

And if "all" is supposed to be

In this case, the intent can be seen from the fact

that the feeders and the horse walker are included, which are
not part of that surveyed property in the final Bill of Sale.
So, Your Honor, you can look at that and determine that,
4 I sure, they intended "all" to mean all six and not just three.
5

But, Your Honor, I think -- I think it's clear from the

6

evidence that's come up there is no doubt about it that there

7

is some ambiguity.

8

six sheds, 30 panels instead of the three they got.

9

would have been that clear.

If it had been clear, it would have said

THE COURT:

10

Or it

Let me ask, point you to the Bill of

11

Sale.

It says that, "The seller assigns and transfers unto

12

the buyer that certain personal property now at 6006 South

13

7100 West more particularly described."

14

that language there was the personal property now at this

15

address?

16

contemporaneously with the conveyance of the real property

17

which has now been surveyed.

18

about the 2 acres of where it is.

But wouldn't you say

1 mean, this is the Bill of Sale's being executed

19

MR.

STEVENSON:

20

THE COURT:

I mean, there is no ambiguity

Your Honor

—

So, we are talking about now, this is in

21

April, long after the parties have contracted, the survey has

22

occurred.

23

stakes.

24

satisfied with the survey and the staking of the four corners

25

of the property.

Your clients have gone out and looked at the four
They know where that property is.

They are

They know where that property is.

And now

1

it's talking about the property they are buying.

2

that certain property now at this address.

3

MR. STEVENSON:

4

THE COURT:

5

Your Honor

And it says

—

Are your sheds A, B and C now at this

2 acres at 6006?
MR. STEVENSON:

6

No, Your Honor.

The same language

7 I

minus the word "now" exists in the REPC.

And there's already

8

been testimony, Your Honor, that there was no change that was

9

done by Miss Stone or by her agent to that final Bill of

10

Sale.

11

contract had.

12

important issue, if it says -- and I agree with you, I

13

understand your point -- but, Your Honor, it includes the

14

horse walker and feeders that weren't on her —

15

their property.

weren't on

But she could give them anything she

wanted, couldn't she?
MR. STEVENSON:

18
19

But, more importantly, Your Honor, the most

THE COURT:

16
17

It's simply reflected what the real estate purchase

Honor.

Including the three sheds, Your

They certainly could have given the sheds --

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STEVENSON:

Does it say six sheds?
It just says "all."

That's why there

22

is ambiguity, Your Honor.

That's why we need the parole

23

evidence to show what the parties intended.

24

instead -- if, instead, the opposing party were arguing -- if

25

she says, well, it's just a mutual mistake, well, it would

And if

have to be a reasonable mistake.
think we have that.
have testified.

And, in this case, I don't

I mean, we have three individuals who

And the weight of the evidence shows that

she intended for all of it to go.
I guess, Your Honor, we would ask that you find that
there is ambiguity in this Bill of Sale and in this REPC to the
extent that "all" is not defined and opposing party is
challenging it.

We do believe that Your Honor could find that

"all" means all six.

And that she intended -- she intended to

10

give up all this personal property.

11

request tha t Your Honor grant the counter-plaintiffs in this

12

case their relief that they have re quested, stating both

13

conversion and breach of contract.

14

Thank you.

15 :

THE

COURT:

16

MR.

NEELEY:

And for these reasons, we

And put that to Your Honor.

Thank you, Mr. Stevenson, very much.
Your Honor, on behalf of Marlene Stone,

17 i

I appreciate the court's patience in this matter.

18

trial took longer than we anticipated last week.

19

And the

Your Honor, our position in the matter is the, and I

20

am relying to a large extent on the Danes/Vincent case, is

21

that the Bi 11 of Sale in this case is an integrated agreement

22

as it is a final expression of the parties' agreement to

23

disposition of their personal prope rty.

24

Bill of Sal e dated April 16, 2008, the date of closing, is

25

the final e xpression of these parties' agreement and is, has

So, we believe the

1

been referred to in cases as an integrated agreement.
The warranty deed, we believe, is an integrated
document and is the final expression of the parties'
conveyance of the real property, the 2 acres.

The Uniform

Real Estate Contract talks about 2 acres, but it does not
specify the legal description.

The deed and the Bill of

Sale, Your Honor, I think, merge this real estate purchase
contract into these two final documents commonly referred to
in cases now as integrated agreements or integrated
documents:

The warranty deed as it relates to the real

property, the Bill of Sale as it relates to the personal
property.
The Bill of Sale relating to the loafing sheds, to the
horse walker and to the panels, Your Honor, is clear.
not ambiguous.

There is no facial ambiguity.

ambiguity as to the intent of the parties.

It is

There is no

The Bill of Sale

dated April 16 states that Marlene Stone, as seller, is
conveying and selling to Richard and Judy Flint, the buyers,
that certain personal property now at 6006 South 7100 West in
Hooper, Weber County, state of Utah, particularly described as
follows.

Oven, range, refrigerator, window covering, two wate]

irrigation shares, all lounging, loafing sheds, panels, gates,
feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently exist.1'
The key language here, Your Honor, to my way of
thinking, is that certain personal property now at that

9 9 7

address.

It is clear she intended to sell the horse walker.

It's in the Bill of Sale.

It is clear that she intended to

3I

sell the lounging and loafing sheds and panels now at that

4

property.

5

that property located at the 6006 South 7100 West.

6I

That property is described in the Bill of Sale as

Mrs. Stone testified last week that her address is
5996 South 7100 West.

The personal property located on her

property was never intended tc be sold.
the final document.

The Bill of Sale is

The horse walker is listed in here.

10 I

Factually, the horse walker, as I recall the testimony, was

11

it somewhat straddles the property line.

12

walk around there, they not only walk on Mrs. Stone's

13

property, they will also walk on the Flints' property.

14

something, obviously, had to be done with the horse walker.

15

When the horses

So,

So, in this case, Mrs. Stone indicated and had in the

16

Bill of Sale of the property that she's conveying to the

17

Stones that it's on their property.

18

her property, were theirs.

19

All of the panels, all of the gates, all of the sheds, all of

20

the waterers, feeders, that type of thing, all of that

21

personal property on her 15 acres stay with her.

22

personal property on the other 2 acres was conveyed by this

23

Bill of Sale and by the warranty deed that the parties have

24

signed.

25

That that is straddling

And that is the horse walker.

All of the

I don't know that there is a great deal of difference

in referring to the documents as integrated documents or that
the real estate purchase contract merged into the Bill of Sale
and as to the warranty deed.

The real estate purchase

contract, Your Honor, consisted of four or five addendums.

It

is obvious that that needs to be consolidated into one
document.

And that was the final Bill of Sale executed on

April the 16 of 2008.
The real estate purchase contract also references that
items of personal property are going to be sold and conveyed
under a separate Bill of Sale.

So, this real estate purchase

contract continue -THE COURT:
MR. NEELEY:

Where are you reading from?
1.1 of the Real Estate Purchase

Contract.
THE COURT:
MR. NEELEY:

Okay.

Yeah.

Right above the handwritten language of

that.
THE COURT:
MR. NEELEY:

Yeah, I see it.
"Ovens, ranges, refrigerator, window

coverings as presently exist.

The following items shall be

included in this sale and conveyed under separate bill of
sales with warranties as to title.

Then, after that, Your

Honor, we have the addendums that talk about the loafing
sheds and panels and gates and feeders and so forth.

So,

it's clear, Your Honor, that the real estate purchase

??s

1

contract contemplated a final Bill of Sale.

2

Bill of Sale.

3

2 acres.

4

We have a final

Document refers to sheds and gates on that

And it clearly conveys the horse walker as well.
The only other point, Your Honor, that we would make

5

is that under paragraph 17 of the confidential general

6

release and settlement agreement, the parties could ask for

7

attorney fees in this case.

8

We have expended 12 hours in this case.

9

this case.

I have prepared an affidavit.

I have expended 12 hours.

1 got in late in
I typically charge

10

$200 per hour.

11

this case plus costs.

12

to award attorney fees in this matter, Your Honor.

13

you.
THE COURT:

14
15
16
17
18

And Mrs. Stone's attorney fees are $2,400 in
And I believe it's an appropriate case

Thank you.

Thank

Mr. Stevenson, you may

respond.
MR. STEVENSON:

I'm sure Your Honor must be tired of

hearing the same issues.
THE COURT:

That's okay.

I want to make sure I

19

understand everything the way I should.

That's why I'm

20

asking questions.

21

opportunity as well as Mr. Neeley that same opportunity.

That's why I'm giving you every

22

MR. STEVENSON:

23

Mr. Neeley said this is integrated, it's an integrated

Great.

Thank you, Your Honor.

24

matter in which the REPC, the addendums, and the Bill of Sale

25

are all integrated to a final document, deed of trust, and said

that merger is applicable in this case.
Now, Your Honor, under the case I referred to
earlier, which is Spears vs. "Warr, said that merger is not
applicable where there is ambiguity in the final documents or
where there is the existence of rights which are collateral.
In this case, Your Honor, I would assert that there are two
issues which are ambiguous in the final Bill of Sale.

First,

is the word "all."

What

does all mean?

There is no question it says all.

Is it all encompassing?

either mean three or six sheds.

In this case, it can

It can mean three or 30

panels, gates and other temporary gates -- and other
temporary gates.

The question becomes -- or, I guess, the

second issue, Your Honor, that is ambiguous, first, is the
word "all. "
The second thing is under the final Bill of Sale, it
says, "that certain personal property now at 6006 South 7100
West in Hooper, Utah."

That certain property now.

If we

look at that, that means the court can either interpret that
as meaning it's all the property that's as currently defined
at that residence and for you the final closing documents.
If that's the case, the horse walker and at least two feeders
are not going to be included.

There is also some dispute

about there was at least one panel or gate that was between
the two properties.

So, that certain personal property is

certainly ambiguous with regard to those items that are not

0 01

1

on that certain property.

2

that property.

3

They certainly aren't now part of

So, the question is, if Marlene Stone intended

I'm

4

going to sell just this item, just the horse walker and none

5

other, then her testimony would have been we had a bargain

6

for exchange on that item.

7

the case in the original REPC was the word "all."

8

intended to include all the matters.

9

statement was,

That was not the case.

,f

it all goes."

What was
And it

You know, her original

The way the evidence shows

10

that these items were discussed, and she said it all goes.

11

And so, Your Honor, we would ask you to find that there is

12

ambiguity in the final documents under the standards set

13

forth in Spears vs. V\?arr and as further defined by Flores vs.

14

Earnshaw.

15

And, finally, Your Honor, we also pointed out in our

16

direct that Section 17 of the REPC allows for attorney's

17

fees.

18

would, of course, put together an application for that at the

19

time of costs within five days of the ruling.

20

150 an hour, Your Honor.

21

hours we put in to date, but we'll do that with our costs

22

breakdown if Your Honor goes in case for the defendants and

23

counter-plaintiffs.

If Your Honor would like, depending on the ruling, I

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. STEVENSON:

My fees are

Still haven't figured out how many

All right.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Your Honor.

1

THE COURT:

Let me tell you folks what I have done.

2

I have -- I started outlining just some major points that I

3

wanted to give to you, because I anticipated that I would,

4

after hearing argument, render a decision from the bench.

5

The more I began working it through the intricate factual

6

aspects of this, and then later trying to relate it to the

7

case law that I believe is controlling in this case, it

8

became clear to me that I would do a disservice to you as

9

well as to the court if I tried to do this orally.

And that,

10

I think -- so earlier today I began writing my decision.

11

it's mostly written.

12

But I will finish it tomorrow.

13

in the mail tomorrow on this case.

14

MR. STEVENSON:

15

THE COURT:

I don't know that I'll finish it today.
And you'll have my decision
Okay?

Okay.

But 1 think it will be better if it's

16

written out so that you can thoughtfully read it and

17

understand my analysis of the case.

18

you very much, folks

19

MR. STEVENSON:

20 J

MR. NEELEY:

21
22

And

All right.

Thank you, Your Honor,

Thank you,

Well, thank

Q

Or arms that go around in a circle.

And you exercise

the horse that way?
A

Yes.

Q

Would it be fair to say that the horse being

exercised by this horse walker be partly on Marlene's
property and partly on yours?
A

It would have been where it was, correct.
MR. NEELEY:

That's all.

MR. STEVENSON:

Your Honor, I believe while he's

still there, I neglected to add that to the record, would
like to offer the settlement agreement as part of the record
in this case.
THE COURT:
MR. NEELEY:

That's received.
I think it's already in the file, judge.

And I have no objection to it.
THE COURT:
this trial.

Okay.

It's received as an exhibit in

Thank you.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 7
was received into evidence.)
MR. STEVENSON:
THE COURT:

All right.

All right.

Thank you.

You may step

down.
Call your next witness, please.
MR. STEVENSON:

Next witness will be Jeff Harris.
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JEFFREY DEAN HARRIS,
called by DEFENDANT, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR

Q

STEVENSON:

Have a seat up here

Mr. Harris, would you please

state your full name for th<5 record.
A

Jeffrey Dean Harris

Q

Great.

Mr. Harris, we appreciate your patience in

waiting so long to come in and speak.

IT 11 try to make these

questions fairly short and to the point.

Do you -- are you

aware or ever been out to a home located at 6006 Sou th 7100
West in Hooper?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

We went out to look at it.

On what occasion brought y ou to that home?
We were looking at a

house to buy.
Q

When you say we, wh o were you with?

A

My wife Vickie.

Q

Okay.

Did you have a real estate agent that was

helping you look?
A

Yes.

Q

And were you lookin g at the home in response to an

We had Judy Webben from Coldwell Bankers.

MLS 1 isting for the home?

Let me ask you , how did you hear

about the home?
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1

A

I think we saw it on the computer or something.

2

drove by.

3

a flyer, then we set up an appointment to go look at it.

4
5
6|

Q

And it had flyers in the front yard.

All right.

We

We picked up

At any point, did you meet with the

plaintiff in this action, Marlene Stone?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Did you -- did you meet with her on one of the

meetings in which you were going to look at the home?
9 I
10
11

A

What's that?

Q

Did you meet with Marlene Stone when you looked at

the home?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

And what was the size of the property that you were

14

considering buying?

15

A

We were looking at the 2 acres.

16

Q

Okay.

And, in your discussions with Miss Stone about

17

what personal property was included in the 2 acres that you

18

were potentially buying, what did she state was the personal

19

property that was included with that purchase?

20

MR. NEELEY:

Your Honor, I'm going to object on the

21

grounds of hearsay unless he has some type of Real Estate

22

Purchase Contract or something in writing.

23

being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

24

it's clearly hearsay.

25

MR. STEVENSON:

And I think it's
I think

And I would object to that.
Your Honor, this is a party
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opponent -- I mean, admission.
litigation.

This is a party to this

Not only does it establish her own statements --

THE COURT:

But they are statements, even assuming

they were true, they were statements made to him.

They were

not statements made surrounding this transaction, correct?
MR. STEVENSON:

They were -- he hasn't testified that

it has to do with this transaction.
THE COURT:

Then what would be the relevance?

MR. STEVENSON:

Well, it's material, goes to the

plaintiff's state of mind.
THE COURT:

Not necessarily.

The best you could

argue, counsel, would be her state of mind as he may be -- as
she may have been negotiating with Mr. Harrison.

But it

doesn't necessarily state what her state of mind was when she
dealt with the defendants in this case.

And that's what's at

issue before this court.
MR. STEVENSON:

Well, then, Your Honor, I think it

would also show a plan, scheme that showed what her intent
and plan was concerning this property, and would probably
show what her, certainly what her intent and plan was
concerning the property, her motive.
THE COURT:

Let me just ask.

We know that there was

a multiple listing and that there were three options.
was for the sale of the whole 17 acres.

One

Another option was

to sell 2 acres, another option to sell 1 acre.

And he's
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testified.

I assume he can testify about that because he saw

the multiple listing on the computer just as anybody else was
interested in the property.

But, beyond that, what can he

say that would be, that would be a fact in this case?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, Your Honor, I believe he's
already testified that it was the 2 acres that he was looking
at.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STEVENSON:
been established.

So, that's —

I think that's already

The question is whether or not he has

information that would be relevant to what her plan was for
the sale and whether she had, you know, what her motive was
in selling the entire property, what she stated to him it
was.

When I say selling the personal property, whether she

was selling all of that.
THE COURT:

It certainly goes to --

Well, it's clearly hearsay.

So, point to

me an exception that would allow it to come in.
MR. STEVENSON:

Well, I think as I mentioned before,

I think it would go -THE COURT:

Give me a rule, counsel.

MR. STEVENSON:

Under Section 803, Your Honor, for

one thing, I think it would go towards -THE COURT:

8 03.

MR. STEVENSON:
mental,

8 0 3 - 3 would go t o w a r d s t h e

emotional or p h y s i c a l

condition.

existing

I t h i n k t h a t would

i ?R

go towards the, you know, the state of mind of him of
knowing, knowing what the property was that was being offered
as part of it.

It would, go towards her plan in terms of what

she intended on the MLS listing to sell.
THE COURT:
Okay.

Well, first of all, let's go to Rule 803.

Now, what subpart?
MR. STEVENSON:

Well, I would say, first, under

number three and also under 801(d)(2), but we'll get to that
one.

Under 803-3, a statement of the declarant's then

existing state of mind can certainly be an exception to the
rule.

The question here is whether declarant's state of mind

was to include all of this personal property or not.

And

that's certainly at issue in this case.
MR. NEELEY:

And, Your Honor, my response is if there

was a conversation to that effect it was with this gentleman
on a different day, different time, and it's not material or
relevant to the Flints' case.
THE COURT:
that basis.

I'm going to sustain the objection on

I mean, people can make different offers to

different people.

But it doesn't mean that on one day

because she makes an offer to him that it's the same offer
that she made to him.

In fact, isn't it the best evidence as

to what Mr. Flint -- he's already testified of what her
agreement was with him.

So, are you -- you are trying to

have this gentleman testify about what she may have said to
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him and have it contradict what Mr. Flint said?
MR. STEVENSON: Well, what -- I'm not trying to make
contradict at all what Mr. Flint says.
THE COURT:

But hasn't Mr. Flint testified, counsel?

MR. STEVENSON: He has, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And what did he say?

MR. STEVENSON: Well, he's already stated that all of
the personal property was included.
THE COURT:
testimony was.

Well, counsel, that's not what his

The testimony that I recall, and you can

correct me, the testimony that I heard was when he came out
there, and counsel, you asked the question -- or, no, Mr.
Neeley asked the question -- that she wanted to sell all of
the 17 acres and all the property because she didn't want to
have the responsibility of managing any of it further.

Is

that a fair statement?
M R . STEVENSON:

THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

Then Mr. Neeley asked the

question, did you have any conversation with her on or about
February 1st regarding any of the sheds on the 66 foot
right-of-way?

He said, no, he didn't recall any conversation

about any of the sheds on the 66 foot right-of-way.

His

testimony is he assumed that it went because she had made a
general statement in relation to the 17 acres that she wished
to get rid of all of the sheds.

Is that a fair statement?
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MR. STEVENSON:

I think, Your Honor, I'm not real

sure about the timing in terms of when he found out about the
60 acres.

I don't know if that was even at issue.

I don't

think they even knew which 60 acres she might be considering
at that time.

But I won't go back and --

THE COURT:
that testimony.

Well, I marked it at 3:05 when he gave

The testimony was, and Mr. Neeley asked her,

and this was the latter part of February, they had a
And Mr. Neeleyfs

conversation out in the horse barn.

question was, did you recall, have any discussion about the
sheds on the 66 foot right-of-way?

And he said he doesn't

recall any discussion about the sheds on the 66 foot
right-of-way.

He just assumed that those sheds went with the

property because she had talked about selling all of the
17 acres and getting rid of the sheds because she couldn't
manage the property anymore.

That was his testimony.

And I guess -- and I just think it's kind of a
stretch to bring in what somebody else, his conversations
with her on another day and have it somehow be binding in
another contract with another party.
the relevance of that.

I'm straining to see

I mean, I understand what you are

trying to accomplish, but you would be asking -- even if he
said something that you want him to say, would that
contradict what your own client has testified in this case
about?
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MR. STEVENSON:

No, Your Honor.

I think my client

and Mr. Adair have both testified that the parties resolved
that the property would be purchased was 2 acres.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. STEVENSON:

Okay?

And then the discussion that's

already been testified to about what was included, there was
the generalized statement that you have already referenced
to.

And if that is indeed the case, trying to establish

whether that was her plan, her scheme, her intent, is that
what she intended to sell?

This gentleman knows what she

told him about the same 2 acres and what personal property
was included to the extent he can provide value to the court
in saying what one of the parties has stated, I think that
would help the court.
THE COURT:
or Mr. Neeley before

Anything else you wanted to say, counsel,
—

MR. STEVENSON:

Yes.

I guess the other thing under

Rule 807, statements that are offered as evidence of a
material fact, I would say also that this is material fact at
question here, is whether or not the property, the personal
property that .the plaintiff disputes, that is a material fact
in this case.

That under Rule 807 and also under, I guess --

again, I would say this is a party opponent admission.

I

know that under 801(d) (2), it should be an admission by a
party opponent the state has offered against the party.

And
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the parties' own statements, in. either individual or
representative capacity, it seems I'm not sure why Your Honor
would exclude it as a party opponent admission either.

I'm

certainly, I can call him on cross to -- or on rebuttal -- to
show that she had stated something different than what she
had said.

And that is her impeachment.

THE COURT:

Is this something different about her

transaction with Mr. Flint or is it just a statement that she
made to a third person relative to a prospective contract?
MR. STEVENSON:

It would just show the consistency

for the 2 acres that was offered.

She was also offering the

personal property that my client's claim was offered.
THE COURT:
MR. NEELEY:

Anything else, Mr. Neeley?
Your Honor, they are entirely two

different dates, two different situations, two different
parties.

I don't see the connection between the two.

But if

she ever said anything to him, it would not be relevant to
the case at hand where we have his testimony and his written
contract.

That's what is important in the case.

There is no

causal connection between these two parties.
THE COURT:

I'm going to sustain that, the objection.

It's -- I understand, and I respect what you are trying to
accomplish, but we have two different dates, we have two
different prospective buyers.

And the person could make an

offer to one person and days later even reconsider.

See, I
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don't know that I want to do that.

And just because she

makes an offer, even assuming the best scenario for your
client, best evidence, that he made -- she made an offer to
him, and then days later made a different offer to your
client, doesn't necessarily mean that the offer she made to
him is the same one she made him.

People change their minds.

And I just don't think it's relevant.
I think what this court has to do in fairness to both
parties say, what did these parties discuss, and then what
did they finally agree in writing, and not what conversations
may have occurred on another date with other people.

I mean,

if in fact your approach was that the plaintiff in this case
told this gentleman, you know, I told Mr. Flint this, then
that would be an admission against interest.

If she said

something that she's now denying in this trial, and Mr. Flint
is contending that it occurred, and she told him, then it
would be very relevant, because it would be an admission
against interest.
But the fact that she makes a different offer to a
different person on a different day can't be controlling in
this case.

Just can't.

So, I'm going to sustain that

objection.
MR. STEVENSON:

All right.

You can step down.

Thank you, Your Honor.

And you and your wife are free to

go.

1 A1

1
2

Q

Okay.

In your experience, what was the condii

these loafing sheds?

3

A

They were in fair condition.

4

Q

Okay.

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Now, how about the panels and gates?

Are they movable?

Are they -- in

7 I your experience, have you sold these as part of some of your
real estate sales?
91

A

I have.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

New, depending on the brand, they range from a

12

What's the value of these new?

hundred to $150 apiece for like a 12 foot, 14 foot panel.

13

Q

What have you sold used panels for?

14

A

$50 up to 65.

15

Q

Okay.

Would you turn back to the real estate --

16

well, let's turn back to the Bill of Sale.

I'm sorry.

It

17

says on here, ".all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates,

18

feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently exist."

19

the horse walker on Miss Stone's property after the

20

boundaries were changed?

Was

21

A

22

Q

23

A

Never.

24

Q

To your knowledge, were some of the feeders, one or

25

Yes, it was.
• So, it wasn't on the Flints' property at all?

more of the feeders on Miss Stone's property?

A

Yes.

Q

Were there any other items that were actually on Miss

Stone's property at the time that the Flints purchased the
2 acres?
A

I'm sure there was some panels and gates.

Q

Okay.

In your mind, from the language of the Bill of

Sale and the REPC, were the Flints entitled to immediate
possession of those, that property, of the -- let me specify
which property I'm talking about -- of the sheds which are
shown as A, B, and C on the map?
question.

Let me ask you first that

Were they entitled to immediate possession based

on the REPC and the Bill of Sale for the sheds at A, B and C?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

What about the panels, any of the movable

panels that were on Miss Flints -- on Miss Stone's property?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

They were all present.
Do you have any, any experience, either in

selling real estate or personally, in which you had to
install any of these sheds, where you had to install them?
A

I haven't had to install them, no.
MR. STEVENSON: Okay.

No further questions for this

witness.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

1

the winter, it was a good situation to work out, because now

2

we had loafing sheds for the horses, a hay barn with stalls,

3

and now a pasture to turn them out in and, also, two other

4

properties that we could make hay for them in the winter.

5

Q

Okay.

And let me ask you about the discussion that

6

you had when you talked about what items were on her property

7

were going to be included in the sale.

8

discussion.

9

happen, to the best of your recollection.

10

A

Tell me about that

And, first, tell me approximately when did it

First part of February.

And we had driven by and

11

seen it, me and Judy.

12

appointment to meet with her, I think, around 1 ofclock or

13

two, or something like that in the afternoon.

14

had drove down by it and seen it.

15

now that we are already here maybe we can just see if we

16

could look at it now.

17

Marlene.

18

that you have already scheduled.

19

drove around and went back up and talked to Joe for a while

20

until the time came.

21

appointment time and met with Marlene.

22

And then we called -- we had an

Me and Judy

And so, we thought, well,

And so, we called Joe.

And Joe called

And she says, no, you'll have to come at the time
So, then me and Judy just

And then we came back to that

And she took us through the house and showed us all

23

the house and upstairs, ail the room.

Then from her bedroom,

24

master bedroom you can look out the window and see the whole

25

property and the pastures and everything.

And that's when we

1

started talking about the 2 acres or the whole acres, or 1

2

acre or the whole thing.

3

would like it all.

4

settle for what I can afford.

5

with some of the items or 2 acres with everything.

6

says, well, we would like to get the 2 acres.

7

was after that that she mentioned about the road and that she

8

would have to put in a 60 foot right-of-way.

9

looked at it I was thinking that the whole 2 acres was

And 1 says, if I had the money I

But until I win the lottery I'll have to
So, she mentioned the 1 acre
And we

And then it

At the time I

10

actually covering everything, you know.

11

says about taking out the 60 feet, I wasn't sure at first

12

what side she was talking about.

13

if she took it off the other side that would do away with the

14

driveway and that.

15

picture where it was going to be until they come out and

16

surveyed and pounded the stakes in.

17

presented a different illusion in my mind as to what

18

everything was.

19

And so, when she

But then I thought, well,

That wouldn't work.

But I didn't really

Then that, of course,

But we did talk about like Joe mentioned.

She -- she

20

had lost her husband.

They had been quite tied up with the

21

horse business that they- had had and hadn't really had time

22

to get away and do anything as far as vacations and things.

23

And she says that she just wanted to get rid of everything.

24

She was going to move.

25

going to.

And she had sold her tractor, or

And she had already sold her baler and swather and

1

a few things.

And we ended up buying a harrow from her and a

2

spring tooth that we bought off of her.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

And she told us that everything that was there was

5

there.

There's a little trailer that goes with a, like a

6

lawnmower, riding lawnmower or four-wheeler that was left out

7

there on the side property out by the front of the road

8

that's still sitting there.

9

There is the troughs.

She says that come with it.

There were several troughs, several

10

feeders.

11

don't want anything.

12

barn.

13

an electric water heater and a calf delivery for pulling a

14

calf out of a cow that was in there that later come up

15

missing.

16

went, we didn't know.

17

And she just says everything went.

She said, I

In fact, everything that was in the

She says, I don't care about the feeders.

And I had mentioned that to her.

There was

But where they

A time or two we had driven down the far road to the

18

north.

19

had been there to look at it, it was always closed.

20

don't know if someone else was there or what,.

21

else was left there.

22

stuff that had old halters and different things in that's

23

still sitting there now.

24

those two items that disappeared.

25

Q

And we could see the barn door was open.

And when we
So, I

But everything

There was even a garbage can full of

Let me ask you:

And nobody took anything other than

Looking back at this Addendum 1, we

talked about the loafing sheds.

It says, pane Is, gates.

Can

From your knowledge now of where the

2

you tell me how many?

3

survey shows the lines are on Plaintiff's Exhi bit 1, have you

4

counted the number of panels, you know, mobile panels?

5

you counted how many are on your property and how many are on

6

Miss Stone's property?

7
8

A

If yrou look at the top picture on this here, there is

the two pane Is in front of the shed.
THE

9
10

Have

COURT: Are we talking about Exhib it 3, for the

record?

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR.

STEVENSON:

13

THE

WITNESS:

Yeah.
Yes.

She has dismantled them and leaned them

14

up against that shed there so that she could d rive through on

15

that 60 feet.

16

two others that are the galvanized panels that are further up

17

along that 60 foot right-of-way.

18

foot panels.
THE

19

And so, there's two there.

And then, there's

So, there is four of the 16

And then, as you get up there by -COURT:

You just asked a question about this 60

20

foot right-of-way.

Did she, at the time, indicating that she

21

was going to be keeping some of that property because you

22

were only going to be buying 2 acres, did she in any hand

23

gestures or discussions about the property in terms of

24

monuments or marks, approximate where this right-of-way would

25

occur?

A

That's on her property.

Then there is 11 more

galvanized panels that existed here on where item "C" is
right there.

That loafing shed there, there was a corral

there with those gates.

And then over here by the where the

horse walker was, there is some panel there.

And I counted

to the best that I could see around 11 more panels.

And then

there is two gates, walk-through gates that are included in
those panels.
Q

Okay.

Now, let me have you turn to what's been shown

as the, I guess, Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, which is the Bill
of Sale.

Should be to your left on the top of the -- just

further to your left there.
A

Oh, right here?

Okay.

Q

I think it's under the picture you just put there.

A

Oh.

Q

Here, it is.

A

Okay.

Q

Okay.

Yeah.

Under the Bill of Sale, the bottom of the

first paragraph, these are the items that were included in
the Bill of Sale.

And I want you to go through and tell me

if any of these, which ones are disputed.
range.

All right.

Oven,

Is there any dispute as far as you know concerning

the oven and range?
A

No.

Q

All right.

Refrigerator?
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A

No.

Q

Window covering?

A

Urn, no.

Q

All right.

A

No.

Q

We have talked about the loafing sheds -- lounge and

loafing sheds.

Two water irrigation shares?

There is, I think you said, that there is --

now let me ask you this:

Which loafing sheds are in dispute

and when did they first become in dispute?
A

A, B, and C is what is the issue on the loafing sheds

right now.
Q

All right.

Now, tell me to your best knowledge, when

did that first become in dispute?

When did those loafing

sheds first come into dispute?
A

After she revoked the lease on the 15 acres, then she

says I'm taking everything back.
back.

So, she took the pastures

We had to have our horses off the property by the 1st

of January.

And then, at that point, she started talking

"this is my side and this is your side.11

And I said

something about the panels.
•And she says, No.

Them are not your panels.

I says, They certainly are.

I says, We agreed to all

of that.
And she says, Why would you think they would be yours
if they are on my ground?
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And I said, Well, when we talked about it, it wasn't
2 I necessarily on your ground because at that time it hadn't
3
4
5
6I

been surveyed.
Q

Okay.

And did you have any other discussions about

anything else that was on her ground or your ground?
A

No.

walker.

She told me that she didn't care about the horse

That if I wanted it I could have that.

But I had to

have that off by the 1st of February.
Q

All right.

Let me keep having you take a look at the

10I

Bill of Sale some more.

11

panels and the gates.

12

they in dispute?

13

A

It says -- we talked about the
How many gates are in dispute, and are

Well, there would be four, going up the north side,

14

then two over by this shed, the wooden shed, item "E" on that

15

fence line.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Okay.

19

East fence line, there is two gates there.
And are those mobile gates?

So, you could use those to corral your

animals?

20

A

I could, yeah.

21

Q

Now, feeders.

22

Were there any disputes about any

feeders?

23

A

Not to my knowledge.

24

Q

Okay.

25

When you purchased the property, or let's say

at the time of the Bill of Sale, when you obtained possession

of th e property, were some of the feeders on her side of the
property?

A

There was a couple of metal ones.

Q

Okay.

And did she dispute whether those feeders were

her ' s?

1

A

Um-hmm.

Q

Okay.

Has there been a lawsuit concerning the

possession of those feeders?

A

No.

Q

All right.

I

Next, the waterers.

Is there any dispute

on an y of the waterers?

A

Not that I know of.

Q

Okay.

The horse walker.

Is there a dispute on the

horse walker?

A

Not any longer.

have that.

Like I say, she told me that I could

And I says, Well, I thought it was mine anyway.

But she says, I want it off my property.

Q

Okay.

And so, the horse walker, she didn't bring any

sort of suit to claim that that was her's, correct?

A

No.

Q

All right.

A

Other than I had to have it moved by the 1st of

She didn't dispute the horse walker?

February.

Q

Okay.

So, under this Bill of Sale, it says all

loafing -- all lounging and loafing sheds.

So, let me just
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make sure I clarify for the court what the dispute in your
understanding is, is that for the loafing sheds there is
3 1 three sheds in dispute, which are A, B, and C, correct?
4|

A

(No audible answer.)

Q

There are panels which I believe you said that there

is four 16 foot panels and eleven 10 foot panels in dispute?
A

Right.

Q

Those are the mobile panels?

A

Yes.

10I

Q

Then you said there was some -- two gates?

11

A

Four.

12

Q

Four mobile gates?

13

A

Yeah.

14

Q

Okay.

15

That are galvanized.

And the feeders that were on her property and

the horse walker, those haven't been in dispute?

16

A

No.

17

Q

Okay.

Let me ask you to look at the picture.

There

18

is the two pictures that you identified which are labeled as

19

Defendant's Exhibit 3, which is --

20

A

This one?

21

Q

Yeah, that.

Are the pictures of the panels -- I know

22

the court, I believe they asked you if those are the panels.

23

Are these the 4 foot -- I mean, the 16 foot panels or the 10

24

foot panels?

25

A

Them are the 16.

Q

Okay.

Are the 10 foot panels similar in nature to

those?
A

Yes.

Only just smaller.

you can clamp them together.

Then there is clamps that

You put two clamps on each

section, so you got two up and two bottom that you put them
together.

Then you put a bolt through the middle.

And

that's what holds them together.
MR. STEVENSON:

Okay.

Your Honor, I would like to

move to have Exhibit 3, Defendant's Exhibit 3 moved into
evidence.
MR. NEELEY:
THE COURT:

I have no objection.
It's received.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 3
was received into evidence.)
MR. STEVENSON:
BY MR.

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

STEVENSON:

Now, you testified that Miss Stone now claimed that

the sheds were her's.

And, approximately the time period,

let me ask you, were these -THE COURT:
mind.

Let me ask you.

You mentioned January.

did I misunderstand you?
THE WITNESS:

That isn't clear in my

Is this January of '08?

Or

When did you find out that the --

Yeah.

It was January of -- no, of '09

when we had to have the horses off the property.
THE COURT:

Well, that makes sense to me.

This
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THE COURT:

Are you talking about the gates now?

MR. STEVENSON: These are the gates, yeah.
sorry.

That's confusing.

BY MR.

STEVENSON:

Q

Let me clarify again.

I'm

This has to do with the

panels, the mobile panels that can be used to fence in
animals and other things, right?
A

Right.

Q

I believe your testimony was earlier that there was

eleven 10 foot and four 16 foot panels that are still on Miss
Stone's property that you claim are your property, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

All right.

Looking at that sheet that's in front of

you, can you tell us what the new value of those panels is?
A

Well, the new value would be 114.95.

Q

Okay.

A

That's for the 16 foot.

Q

Okay.

Is that for the 10 foot or the 16 foot?

How about the 10 foot?

THE COURT:
BY MR.

Give me the 16 foot again, cost of it.

STEVENSON:

Q

Thank you.

A

Pardon?
THE COURT:

Hear him?

Give me the price again of the 16 foot

panel.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

The 16 foot panels would be at

pp

1

Q

And do you know what that number is?

2

A

Not right off.

3

well, let's see.

Be 800 something.

4

Q

5

minute.

6
7(

It would be 700 —

Okay.

Well, we can go through this summary here in a

But, Your Honor, I think just -A

I had that on the back of one of my papers, that I

wrote it on the back.
MR. STEVENSON:

Your Honor, just take judicial notice

10 I of what the 10, or, I guess 11 times 74.95 would be the value
11

of the new panels.

12

the -- I mean --

Then seven times 16 would be the value of

13

THE WITNESS:

14

MR. STEVENSON:

Four times.
Four times -- four times, I guess

15

104.95 would be the value of the other panels.

16

B Y MR.

17
18
19

Q

STEVENSON:

Now, you have testified that there is also 12 square,

I guess, panels.
A

Okay.

What are you talking about with those?

These were panels that was there.

Joe Adair

20

says that he thinks they were there when Nolan Kirtland had

21

his horses there on the place prior to Marlene and them

22

coming there.

23

never seen them sold anywhere.

24

have been handmade or what.

25

corner of the shed and where the pigeon pen is.

And they are a different type of gate.

I have

I don't know whether they

But they were on the northeast

exact date.
Q

Okay.

And do you recall having any other discussions

with Miss Stone after February 1st in which you discussed the
property prior to the closing date?
A

You mean what went with the property?

Q

Yes.

A

We didn't really discuss anything other than -- and

What went with the property.

I'm not sure that when we were in the barn looking -- she
took us to the barn to show us the water hookups and the
electrical hookups in the barn.

I'm not sure if that was

before or after we signed the contract.

But nothing was ever

said other than what we discussed in her bedroom in the
hallway on February 1st when we signed the papers then.
Q

Okay.

Now, I want you to focus in on that discussion

on February 1st.

You said you had a discussion with her in

her bedroom or in the hallway.

And tell me to your

recollection what was said.
A

About what went with the property?

Q

Yes.

A

That it would include all of the loafing sheds, all

of the panels, the barn, the hay barn, that she no longer -she had sold or eliminated all of her livestock.

She no

longer had a use for it.
Q

Okay.

Did she talk about any of the waters or

feeders?
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A
walker.

Every -- all the waters, the feeders, the horse
All of the horse equipment that would go with the

upkeep of horses.

The controlling of where -- the

whereabouts of the horses.
Q

Okay.

Did she indicate at that time that she was

interested in developing the 15 acres behind your property?
A

Yes.

Q

Did she indicate what she was intending to do with

the 60 -- well, with the, I guess you said it was later you
found out that there was going to be a right-of-way?
A

Right.

Q

At the time you said on that date, though, she

discussed wanting to have a right-of-way?
A

She discussed wanting to have a right-of-way.

Q

Did she say what she wanted to put in the

right-of-way?
A

She was going to develop that into a subdivision.

And she needed a right-of-way to get back to that.
Q

Okay.

And, at that time, tell me about anything that

you recall about her, the statements she stated.

Do you

recall anything else about what she stated would come with
the property?
A

Best of my knowledge is -- to the best that I

remember, she said if you bought the 2 acres it would include
all the loafing sheds, all the gates, all the panels, all the
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waterers, all the feeders, the horse barn and the hay shed.
Q

Okay.

Now, in front of you is what's marxed as

Defendant's Exhibit 3.

And it's the Bill of Sale.

A

Three?

Q

I think it should be to your left.

A

Yes .

Q

The bottom paragraph -- well, let me ask you first:

To your left.

Have you seen this document before?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Do you recall seeing it at the closing, of

when you had the closing on the home?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

parties.

This document has been stipulated to by the

If you'll look at the bottom of paragraph, bottom

sentence of the first paragraph, it says, "Particularly
described as follows:"

And then it lists a number of things,

"Oven, range, refrigerator, window covering, two irrigation
shares, all loafing -- lounging and loafing sheds, panels
gates, feeders, waterers and horse walker as presently
exist."

Is that the same understanding that you had on

February 1st when you spoke with her that this was the
personal property?
A

Yes.

24 I

Q

That was being sold with the real estate?

25

A

Yes.

With the 2 acres.
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Q

At that time -- when I say at that time, at the

of the closing, did you already know where the property
boundaries were?
4

A

When we signed the final closing?

5

Q

Yes.

6

A

After her surveyor?

7

Q

Yes.

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

Okay.

Of the items that are listed there under this

10

Bill of Sale, were any of these items on Miss Stone's

11

property at the date of closing?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Well, let me state it this way so I can be clear.

14

The date after closing, the dare after you closed and you now

15

owned the property, which of these items were physically

16

located on Miss Stone's property?

17

A

There was a double loafing shed, a single loafing

18

shed, and then a loafing shed that was, had a roof and two

19

sides.

20

feeders.

21

Q

There was the horse walker.

There were two metal

And I don't know how many panels and gates.
Okay.

And, to your knowledge, has there been any

22

dispute about the feeders?

23

that were on either her property or yours?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Okay.

Are you using all the feeders

And the horse walker, that's been moved onto

your property,

correct?

A

Yes, it has.

Q

All right.

And when did you first learn that there

was a dispute about, that there was a dispute about the
contract?
A

About these specific items?

Q

Yes.

A

It was when she told us she didn't want us leasing

her property anymore.
Q

Let me ask you:

The --

She said that -Do you remember roughly when that

was when she said she didn't want you leasing the property
anymore?
A

Verbally or in writing?

Q

Weil, how about first verbally?

A

Verbally, it was about the 1st of August.

Q

Okay.

A

As near as I can recall, maybe the end of October.

Q

Okay.

And then in writing?

And then is it your -~ what did she say that

made you believe that some of these items were in dispute?
A

The statement she made to me the first part of August

was -- I was out at the barn with my grandchildren.

And she

drove out there and told me that she had heard that my
husband had been saying that the sheds belonged to us.
And I told her, Yes, that was my understanding.
And she said that they did not.
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loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse
walker as presently exist.1'

Okay.

That's your signature

down at the bottom, February 1st, '08, correct?
A

Yes.

Q

All right.

On February 1st of 2008, did you intend

to include the horse walker?
A

I can't remember.

to my kids about that.
wrong.

Let's see.

I think I had talked

And they said -- no.

No, wait.

I'm

Because Mr. Flint hadn't -- I had just decided maybe

I would just keep the horse walker, I think, until my kids
told me, mom, it's hooked to the barn.

But in between there

Mr. Flint had made it known to me that he would really want
that horse walker.
Q

Okay.

I heard your prior testimony about him.

You

claim that Mr. Flint said he really wanted the horse walker.
You were also asked earlier about any conversations about any
individual equipment out on your property.

Were there

discussions on February 1st of 2008 with the Flints in the
presence of Joe Adair about the individual equipment that was
out on your property?
A

No.

Q

Okay.

So, there was no, there was no discussion

about the individual equipment out there?
A

No.

Mr. Flint just said, Does this stuff stay?

And

we were looking straight east from my bedroom.

ip ^

Q

Okay.

But you are now saying that he also said

really wanted the horse walker?
A

But not at that time.

Q

Okay.

horse walker?
A

When did he say that he really wanted the
Was that after this date?

Had to be, because that was the first time I met

them.
Q

Okay.

So, it had to be after February 1st, then?

A

Yeah.

Q

So, can we establish, at least, that on this date, on

February 1st, 2008, Mr. Flint had not yet told you he really
wanted the horse walker?
A

Well, I didn't know he wanted the horse walker until

I seen it in his offer.

And Mr. Adair had put it in there.

And I thought I didn't agree to sell that.
my kids.

But I talked to

And I did tell. Mr. Flint that I would make it part

of the deal.

Because of the wiring to the barn and the fact

that if he had a horse on there it would be walking partly on
his land and 66 -- because I knew where 66 feet was.

I

didn't know where his corners were at that time, but I did
know I had to keep 66 feet.
have some idea.

So, I measured over so I would

And I knew for a fact that that horse

walker, if there was a horse on it, would be walking
partially on his property.
Q

So, is it your testimony that you had already gone
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out and measured the 66 feet before February 1st, 2008?
A

I had measured that in the summer before that.

Because when I put it up for sale, I knew that if I couldn't
sell it all, and I was pretty sure I couldn't because no one
could afford it, that 1 would have to have a road.

And I

went to the city and asked them what the requirements was.
And they told me.

And so, I thought, okay.

I had my

neighbor help me measure over so that I could have some idea
of where my land would end.
Q

Okay.

So, you -- at some point prior to February,

you already knew where that 66 feet landed?
A

I did, yes.

Q

All right.

My next question is, when you saw this

Real Estate Purchase Contract, and it says all loafing,
lounging sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, horse
walker as presently exist, did you ask at all either to your
real estate agent or to the Flints or Joe Adair, did you ask
what that constituted, what all lounging and loafing sheds
meant?

Did you inquire as to what that meant?

A

No, I did not.

Q

Now, as presently exist.

Let me ask you about that

statement.
A

Okay.

Q

As presently exist.

At the time you didn't know

exactly where the boundary was going to be, did you?
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because it gave me more room to spread out.

But, yes, fr<

the time we talked in her home that day and from what Joe
3 I told us, yes, I figured everything that was there.

She says

4

she wanted to get out of it, she didn't want nothing to do

5

with it, she was upset because her husband spent so much time

6

out there with them, she just wanted to get away.

7I

BY MR.

Q

STEVENSON:

Okay.

And her intention -- okay.

Then the question

9 1 was asked you whether the horse walker was attached to your
10

land.

Was the horse walker physically located on your

11

2 acres after closing?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Okay.

14

No.
Was there electrical wire coming from your

property to the horse walker?

15

A

There was.

16

Q

Okay.

17

Tell me about this horse walker.

large structure?

18

A

Pretty good size.

19

Q

Okay.

20

Was this a

It damn near filled this room.

What was the structure sitting on top of the

horse walker?

21

A

Big cement slab.

22

Q

Okay.

23

A

No.

24

Q

So, from the time of the closing, what was your

25

Is the cement slab on your property?
It's on her's.

understanding about whose property the horse walker was?

ADDENDUM E

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Judge Michael D. Lyon
Case No. 080907234

Defendants.

In this case, Defendants seek a determination, under their counterclaim, that the}'
purchased from Plaintiff certain personal property as part of a real estate purchase transaction.
All claims under Plaintiffs complaint were resolved through mediation, leaving only
Defendants' claim. The parties tried this case without a jury on April 15 and 20, 2009. Following
closing arguments, the Court took the matter under advisement for a review of the trial evidence
and supporting exhibits. Based on the evidence and controlling law, the Court grants judgment in
favor of Plaintiff, no cause of action on Defendants' counterclaim. The Court also awards
Plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee for her defense of Defendants* counterclaim.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marlene Stone owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah,
consisting of approximately 17 acres. She listed the property for sale on the multiple listing
service, giving prospective buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres,
or 3) purchase one acre.
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Defendants Richard Flint and Judy Flint became interested in the property. They and their
realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February 1, 2008. During this initial meeting,
Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away, that she wanted to be relieved of
the burden of managing the property by herself and that she was interested in selling, preferably,
all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr. Flint inquired, "Does all of this
stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both parties seem in agreement that
when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s bedroom window, facing to
the east of Plaintiff s property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and various items of
personal property. For ease of description in this decision, the Court will refer to this personal
property collectively as structures. These structures included mobile fencing, called paners;
mobile gates that interfaces with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can
be moved: and a horse walker.
Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff however, in purchasing only two acres,
encompassing the home and the two barns. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only
two acres, the two acres would not include a strip of her property of approximately 66 feet in
width, lying on the northern part of her property and extending eastward, because she needed an
access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise, she would essentially be landlocked. Plaintiff further
explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested in, encompassing the
home and two barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of real estate
from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed two acres
were undetermined.
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After the parties discussed Defendants' interest in only two acres, no further discussion
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In
point, the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey
and partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres.
Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they were would eventually
purchase because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property any more. Plaintiff on the other
hand, assumed that since the Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres, only the structures
existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she would keep the
structures situated on the remaining 15 acres.
Later that same day, February 1. 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to
the REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to
Defendants* satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures
included in the sale: "All lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse
walker as presently exist."
When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres.
As of February 1, 2008. the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that
was part of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker
rotated partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor
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operating the horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants
were receiving as part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants* offer.
As the parties agreed. Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the
propert)' staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures.
as they may lie inside and outside the two acres.
The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on
exhibit PI. On exhibit PL north is to the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit.
The northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership
in for access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two
acres are the home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two barns identified with the
letters G and H, and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the
boundaries of the two acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are three loafing sheds defined
with letters A. B, and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs propert}' and a
third part)' neighbor. Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to
the east.
In purchasing the home and the two acres. Defendants assumed the original address of
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining
15 acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.
Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred
title to "that certain personal real property

YIOM>

at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah" (emphasis

added). The bill of sale then enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to
the REPC "as presently exist."
Also contemporaneous with the closing. Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the
parties resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed
suit. Thus, those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding
that, as a result of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining
15 acres under the lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different
interpretation of the REPC and bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures.
Defendants believed they had purchased all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas
Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to
the Defendants.
ISSUES PRESENTED
This dispute in the interpretation of the REPC and the bill of sale is the crux of the
lawsuit between the parties. Defendants contend that the language of the REPC and bill of sale
gave them "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as
presently exist," both on the two acres they had purchased and on the 15 acres retained by the
Plaintiff. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues that Defendants received only the structures on the
property they purchased. At issue is whether the word all as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is
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ambiguous. The Court holds that it is not ambiguous.
ANALYSIS
Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts: u (l) facial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties."
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269. 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is
facially ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However.
"before permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial
ambiguity." Id. In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does
not 'trump cthe language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw\ 2009 UT App 90, ^j 10. quoting
Dairies, 2008 UT APP 51 at f27. 190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the
language of the REPC is ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of
what occurred upstairs in Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the
real estate conveyance. The contract controls the rights of the parties.
Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is
facially ambiguous also in Dairies, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First,
"when determining whether a contract is ambiguous, an)7 relevant evidence must
be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided,
namely, it is based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic
education and experience." Second, after a judge considers relevant and credible
evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that "the
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interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract."
Id at % 26, 1 90 P.3d at 1276. quoting Ward v lntermouniain Farmers Ass n, 907 P.2d 264. 268
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise permit."
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, at \ 27, 190 P.3d ai 127th
The Utah Court of Appeals applied these principles in Floras, 2009 UT App 90. In
Floras, the parties entered into an agreement for the sale of a "yet-to-be-built condominium unit.'*
Id. at K 1. Although the building itself did not yet exist, the parties used a standard real estate
purchase contract (REPC) to accomplish the sale. Clause 1.1 of the REPC, entitled "Included
Items" stated: "Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned
and attached to the Property*. . .'" Id. at % 5 (emphasis added b) Flares court). The trial court
determined that the surrounding circumstances of the case, including the fact that the building
had not yet been built, rendered clause 1.1 ambiguous. The court of appeals disagreed, holding
that clause 1.1 was not facially ambiguous. Id. at ^1 14. The court emphasized that "the
enumerated items are included in the sale only if they were presently owned and attached to the
Property.''' Id. Since the building had not yet been constructed, "none of the items listed in
clause 1.1 were owned and attached to the property at the time the REPC was executed^]'" Id.
The court concluded that "based on the plain language of the REPC. the parties intended for the
sale to convey only a 'shell' of [the unit].'" Id.
The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a
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signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is
identical to clause 1.1 of the contract in Floras. It states that the listed items are included "if
presently owned and attached to the Property.'' The Court determines that, as in Flares., this
provision is unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not "presently
owned and attached to the Property.'* namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property
included in the sale, identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit Pl 5 includes the house, the
two barns labeled G and H, and the structures labeled F, D5 and 1. It does not include the loafing
sheds labeled A, B. and E, nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C. Those
structures are not "presently owned and attached to the Property" to be conveyed and. under the
unambiguous terms of the contract, were not intended to be conveyed to Defendants.
Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically
identified, such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to
Defendants, namely, "that certain personal property now-1 at 6006 S. 7100 W.? Hooper, Utah,
more particularly described as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water
irrigation shares, all lounging and loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse
walker as presently exist." (Emphasis added.) Consequently, the Defendants received only three
loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other three remaining on Plaintiffs
property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their propert)-, as well as the waterers
and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker was on Plaintiffs property, and
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thus may technically be on her property, because it also rotated partially on Defendants" property
and because the apparatus was wired to the bam, Plaintiff chose to allow them to have it
provided the}' moved it completely on to their property.
Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants'
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC. Accordingly, she may present her
counsel's affidavit to the Court, sending also a copy to Defendants' counsel to give him an
opportunity to object to the reasonableness of the fees. As counsel prepares the affidavit, the
Court reminds the parties that reasonable attorney fees are not merely measured by what an
attorney actually bills and the number of hours spent on the case. Rather, in determining fees, the
Court, should consider those factors addressed in case law, namely, what work was actually
performed, the work reasonably necessary to adequately defend the matter, the attorney's billing
rate and whether it is consistent with customar}' rates in the locality, and any other circumstances
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
990 (Utah 1988).
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from
their discussions upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of
law., that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and
structures are both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two
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acres at the time of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the
contract or bill of sale.
Dated this (7H day of April. 2009.

MM.. 0, KK^,
Michael D. Lyon, Judge I
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I hereby certify that on the J w day of April, 2009. I sent a true and correct cop) of the
foregoing ruling to counsel, as follows:
Robert L. Neeley
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden. Utah 84401
David B. Stevenson
Attorney for Defendants
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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Telephone: (801) 621-3646
Fax No.: (801)621-3652
bobneeley@yahoo .com
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
MARLENE STONE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD FLINT and JUDY FLINT,

Civil No. 080907234
Judge: Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.
Non-jury trial in the above-entitled matter come on regularly for hearing before the aboveentitled Court on April 15 and April 20,2009. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, was personally present and
represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley, and Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, were
personally present and represented by their attorney, David B. Stevenson. Plaintiff and Defendants
were sworn and testified, together with witness Joe Adair and the court having received exhibits
from Plaintiff and Defendants and having taken the matter under advisement and having issued its
Memorandum Decision, therefore makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff, Marlene Stone, owned real property known as 6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah,
consisting of approximately 17 acres.
2. Plaintiff listed the property for sale on the multiple listing service, giving prospective
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buyers three options: 1) purchase all 17 acres, 2) purchase two acres, or 3) purchase one acre.
3. Defendants, Richard Flint and Judy Flint, became interested in the property. They and
their realtor, Joe Adair, met with the Plaintiff on February, 1, 2008.
4. During this initial meeting, Plaintiff explained that her husband had recently passed away,
that she wanted to be relieved of the burden of managing the property by herself, and that she was
interested in selling, preferably, all of her 17 acres, including the structures on the property. Mr.
Flint inquired, "Does all of this stuff stay with the property?" Plaintiff replied affirmatively. Both
parties seem in agreement that when Defendant asked his question, he was looking out of Plaintiff s
bedroom window, facing to the east of Plaintiff s property, overlooking the hay barn, horse barn, and
various items of personal property. These structures included mobile fencing, called panels; mobile
gates that interface with the panels; open sheds, called loafing sheds, for animals that can be moved;
and a horse walker.
5. Defendants expressed interest to Plaintiff however, in purchasing only two acres,
encompassing the home and the two barns.
6. Plaintiff explained that if the Defendants wanted only two acres, the two acres would not
include a strip of her property approximately 66 feet in width, lying on the northern part of her
property and extending eastward, because she needed access to the remaining 15 acres; otherwise,
she would essentially be landlocked.
7. Plaintiff further explained that in order to sell the two acres the Defendants were interested
in, encompassing the home and barns, she would need to obtain a survey to partition this amount of
real estate from the aggregate 17 acres because, at that time, the exact boundaries of the proposed
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two acres were undetermined.
8. After the parties discussed Defendants' interest in only two acres, no further discussion
occurred regarding the structures, except regarding the horse walker, as discussed below. In point,
the parties never addressed the structures or where they might be situated after the survey and
partition of two acres from the remaining 15 acres.
9. Based on the discussions that occurred in Plaintiffs bedroom, the Defendants assumed
that all structures on the entire 17 acres went with the two acres they would eventually purchase
because Plaintiff did not want to manage the property anymore.
10. Plaintiff, on the other hand, assumed that since Defendants wanted less than the 17 acres,
only the structures existing on the two acres would pass in the conveyance to the Defendants; she
would keep the structures situated on the remaining 15 acres.
11. Later that same day, February 1, 2008, Mr. Adair, Defendants' realtor, prepared and
presented to Plaintiff a real estate purchase contract (hereafter "REPC"). The first addendum to the
REPC provided that Plaintiff would have the property surveyed and the four corners staked to
Defendants" satisfaction prior to closing of the sale. The first addendum also listed the structures
included in the sale: "all lounging/loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders/waterers and horse walker as
presently exist."
12. When the Defendants presented the REPC through Mr. Adair, she told him that, if they
wanted the horse walker, the Defendants would need to move it completely on to the two acres. As
of February 1, 2008, the base of the horse walker was situated on the eventual ground that was part
of the 66-foot-wide access reserved by Plaintiff, although the arm of the horse walker rotated
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partially into the two acres the Defendants would purchase. Further, the electric motor operating the
horse walker was wired to the barn, also within the two acres that the Defendants were receiving as
part of the two acres. Otherwise, Plaintiff accepted the Defendants' offer.
13. As the parties agreed, Plaintiff had the property surveyed and the four corners of the
property staked just prior to the closing on the property on April 16, 2008. Defendants physically
inspected the staked property they were to purchase and were satisfied with the boundaries. Even
at this juncture of the parties' dealings, no further discussions occurred regarding the structures, as
they may lie inside and outside the two acres.
14. The boundaries of the two acres Defendants purchased are defined by the pencil line on
exhibit PI. On exhibit PI, north is the top of the exhibit and west is to the left of the exhibit. The
northern boundary of the two acres abuts the 66-foot-wide strip Plaintiff retained ownership in for
access to the remaining 15 acres of her property. Included in the boundaries of the two acres are the
home in the lower left-hand corner of the exhibit, the two barns identified with the letters G and H,
and the structures defined with the letters F, D, and I. Excluded from the boundaries of the two
acres, and appearing in Plaintiffs access, are the three loafing sheds defined with the letters A. B.
and C. Structure A abuts the property line between Plaintiffs property and a third party neighbor.
Structure E also remains on Plaintiffs remaining property that extends to the east.
15. In purchasing the home and the two acres, Defendants assumed the original address of
6006 S. 7100 W. in Hooper, Utah. Hooper City gave Plaintiff a new address for her remaining 15
acres, known as 5990 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.
16. Contemporaneous with the closing on the real property, the title company prepared a bill
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of sale that Plaintiff signed and Defendants accepted in the closing. The bill of sale transferred title
to "that certain personal real property now at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah.'1 The bill of sale then
enumerated the personal property specified in the first addendum to the REPC "as presently exist."
17. Also contemporaneous with the closing, Plaintiff leased to Defendants the remaining 15
acres of her property to Defendants for one year. That lease was later broken in 2008, and the parties
resolved their rights and liabilities under that lease through mediation after Plaintiff filed suit. Thus,
those matters are not before the Court. Nonetheless, it is relevant in this proceeding that, as a result
of friction between the parties stemming from Defendants' use of the remaining 15 acres under the
lease agreement, the parties realized that each side had a different interpretation of the REPC and
bill of sale regarding the meaning of "all" of the structures. Defendants believed they had purchased
all of the structures existing on the 17 acres, whereas Plaintiff believed she had sold only all of the
structures on the two acres that she had conveyed to the Defendants.
THE COURT having entered its Findings of Fact makes the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. At issue is whether the word all, as used in the REPC and bill of sale, is ambiguous. The
Court holds that it is not ambiguous.
2. Contractual ambiguity may occur in two contexts:"(1) facial ambiguity with regard to the
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the intent of the contracting parties."
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 5 1 ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269, 1276. The Utah Supreme Court went on to
further clarify: "The first context presents a question of law to be determined by the judge. The
second context presents a question of fact where, if the judge determines that the contract is facially
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ambiguous, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be admitted." Id. However, "before
permitting recourse to parol evidence, a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Id.
In other words, extrinsic evidence offered to show that an ambiguity exists does not "trump 'the
language of the contract.'" Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90 ^j 10, quoting Dairies, 2008 UT
APP 51 at U 27, 190 P.3d at 1276. In short, unless the Court finds that the language of the REPC is
ambiguous, it may not consider parol evidence, or the discussions of what occurred upstairs in
Plaintiffs bedroom concerning what personal property goes with the real estate conveyance. The
contract controls the rights of the parties.
3. Thus, the first responsibility of this Court is to determine whether a facial ambiguity
exists. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the procedure for determining whether a contract is
facially ambiguous also in Dairies, where the Court set forth a two-step analysis. First,
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be
considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based
solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience." Second,
after a judge considers relevant and credible evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must
ensure that "the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the
contract."
Id. at TI 26, 190 P.3d at 1276, quoting Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass % 907 P.2d 264, 268
(Utah 1995). The Court later clarified that "we [do] not intend that a judge allow surrounding
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of the contract would not otherwise permit."
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, at \ 27, 190 P.3d at 1276.
4. The Flores case is factually similar to the present case. Plaintiff and Defendants have a
signed agreement identifying what is included in the sale. Clause 1.1 of their agreement is identical
to clause 1.1 of the contract in Flores, It states that the listed items are included "if presently owned
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and attached to the Property."

The Court determines that, as in Flares, this provision is

unambiguous and cannot be read to include any items that were not ''presently owned and attached
to the Property," namely, the two acres Defendants purchased. The property included in the sale,
identified as a pencil line on Plaintiffs exhibit PI, includes the house, the two barns labeled G and
H, and the structures labeled F, D, and I. It does not include the loafing sheds labeled A, B, and E,
nor the panels or gates on most of the structure labeled C Those structures are not ''presently owned
and attached to the Property'* to be conveyed and, under the unambiguous terms of the contract, were
not intended to be conveyed to Defendants.
5. Moreover, the bill of sale, which is the final, integrated expression of the parties' intent
concerning the transfer of personal property in this transaction, transferred only those items of
personal property presently existing on the two acres conveyed or otherwise specifically identified,
such as the horse walker. The bill of sale plainly states what Plaintiff sold to Defendants, namely,
"that certain personal property naw at 6006 S. 7100 W., Hooper, Utah,..., more particularly described
as follows: oven/range, refrigerator, window coverings, 2 water irrigation shares, all lounging and
loafing sheds, panels, gates, feeders, waterers, and horse walker as presently exist." Consequently,
the Defendants received only three loafing sheds on their newly acquired real property, not the other
three remaining on Plaintiffs property. Likewise, they received the panels and gates on their
property, as well as the waterers and feeders on their property. While the base of the horse walker
was on Plaintiffs property, and thus maj' technically be on her propert}', because it also rotated
partially on Defendants' property and because the apparatus was wired to the barn, Plaintiff chose
to allow them to have it, provided they moved it completely on to their property.
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6. Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney fee for the successful defense of Defendants"
counterclaim, as provided in paragraph 17 of the REPC.
7. Notwithstanding the respective expectations or understandings of the parties arising from
their discussion upon their initial meeting on February 1, 2008, the real estate purchase contract
superceded all prior negotiations, representations, and understandings of the parties, as the clear
language of paragraph 14 of the REPC provides. Moreover, the Court concludes, as a matter of law,
that the REPC and the bill of sale governing the transfer of the personal property and structures are
both unambiguous. Defendants are entitled to all structures that exist on the two acres at the time
of the contract and at closing, unless otherwise expressly provided in the contract or bill of sale.

DATED this

day of May 2009.
APPROVED AND ORDERED BY:

MICHAEL D. LYON
District Court Judge

RULE 7(f)(2) NOTICE
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned will submit the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order Dismissing Respondent's
Counterclaim, Affidavit of Robert L. Neeley, and Memorandum of Cost to:
Michael D. Lyon
District Court Judge
2525 Grant Ave.
OgderuUT 84401
for signature at the expiration of eight (8) days from date of mailing, unless written objection is
filed prior to that time.

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE O F MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, Order Dismissing Respondent's Counterclaim, Affidavit of Robert L. Neeley, and
Memorandum of Cost to Defendants' attorney, David B. Stevenson, this / T day of May,
2009, postage prepaid, at the following address:
David B. Stevenson
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
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